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ABSTRACT
On Detection of Current and Next-Generation Botnets
by
Yuanyuan Zeng
Chair: Kang G. Shin
Botnets are one of the most serious security threats to the Internet and its end users.
A botnet consists of compromised computers that are remotely coordinated by a
botmaster under a Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure. Driven by nan-
cial incentives, botmasters leverage botnets to conduct various cybercrimes such as
spamming, phishing, identity theft and Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks.
There are three main challenges facing botnet detection. First, code obfuscation is
widely employed by current botnets, so signature-based detection is insucient. Sec-
ond, the C&C infrastructure of botnets has evolved rapidly. Any detection solution
targeting one botnet instance can hardly keep up with this change. Third, the prolif-
eration of powerful smartphones presents a new platform for future botnets. Defense
techniques designed for existing botnets may be outsmarted when botnets invade
smartphones.
Recognizing these challenges, this dissertation proposes behavior-based botnet
detection solutions at three dierent levels|the end host, the edge network and the
Internet infrastructure|from a small scale to a large scale, and investigates the next-
generation botnet targeting smartphones. It (1) addresses the problem of botnet
xii
seeding by devising a per-process containment scheme for end-host systems; (2) pro-
poses a hybrid botnet detection framework for edge networks utilizing combined host-
and network-level information; (3) explores the structural properties of botnet topolo-
gies and measures network components' capabilities of large-scale botnet detection at
the Internet infrastructure level; and (4) presents a proof-of-concept mobile botnet
employing SMS messages as the C&C and P2P as the topology to facilitate future
research on countermeasures against next-generation botnets.
The dissertation makes three primary contributions. First, the detection solutions
proposed utilize intrinsic and fundamental behavior of botnets and are immune to
malware obfuscation and trac encryption. Second, the solutions are general enough
to identify dierent types of botnets, not a specic botnet instance. They can also be
extended to counter next-generation botnet threats. Third, the detection solutions
function at multiple levels to meet various detection needs. They each take a dierent
perspective but are highly complementary to each other, forming an integrated botnet
detection framework.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 The Botnet Threat
A botnet consists of bots, which are computers compromised by malware such as
worms, trojan horses or backdoors without user consent or knowledge. The botnet
herder or the botmaster remotely controls a botnet via a Command and Control
(C&C) infrastructure. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, botnets are usually rented and
sold in the underground market by the botmasters for nancial gains. They can
cooperatively launch various cyber crimes: sending out huge volumes of spam emails,
hosting phishing web pages, stealing users' identities and mounting Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks. Botnets are one of today's most serious security threats
to the Internet and its end users. According to a recent Symantec report [28], botnets
accounted for 77% of all spam sent out in 2010, which was about 10 billion per day
on average. Botnet infections are a global pandemic. Microsoft alone detected and
removed 6.5 million bot infections from Windows machines around the world in the
2nd quarter of 2010, and the most infections|2.2 million|were in the U.S. [27].
The huge number of bot infections worldwide and the serious damage they have
caused make detecting such a threat a pressing and critical task. Botnet detection has
been a major topic in the cyber security community for over half a decade. Numerous
solutions have been proposed to defend against the botnet threat. Nevertheless, there
1
Figure 1.1: The botnet threat
is always arms race between defenders and attackers. State-of-the-art botnets take
advantage of multiple techniques and evolve at an unprecedented speed. They present
considerable challenges to existing botnet detection approaches.
First, like other types of malware, current botnets commonly employ obfuscation
techniques such as polymorphism and metamorphism. Using these techniques, the
bot code can mutate without changing the functions or the semantics of its pay-
load. Usually, in the same botnet, bot binaries are dierent from each other. Since
signature-based detection schemes look for specic data patterns in binaries, it is
dicult for them to identify all obfuscated bots.
Second, the C&C infrastructure has evolved in recent years. To control a botnet,
the botmaster needs a channel to issue commands and coordinate bots. Traditional
botnets utilize centralized C&C mechanisms such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC) or
HTTP protocols. In the IRC's case, usually, the botmaster takes advantage of an IRC
server in a public IRC network by specifying a channel via which bots connect to and
2
listen on to receive commands. HTTP-based botnets are similar to the IRC-based
ones. After infection, bots contact a web-based C&C server and notify the server with
their system-identifying information via HTTP. This server sends back commands via
HTTP responses. IRC- and HTTP-based C&C have been widely used in conventional
botnets, but both of them are vulnerable to a single-point-of-failure. That is, once
the central IRC or HTTP servers are identied and removed, the entire botnet will
be disabled. To be more resilient, attackers have recently utilized decentralized C&C
infrastructures such as P2P, where bots do not directly contact any particular servers
for commands, but rather retrieve commands from informed peer bots. A well-known
example is the Storm botnet [22] which was constructed by the propagation of Storm
worm via email spam and is known to be the rst malware to seed a botnet in a
P2P fashion. Storm utilized Kademlia [61], a decentralized Distributed-Hash-Table
(DHT) protocol. The Storm botnet was estimated to run on between 250,000 and
1 million compromised systems in 2007 and was primarily used for sending spam
emails. Other noteworthy recent P2P botnets include Waledac [25] and Concker [6].
In these botnets, a botmaster can join, publish commands and leave at any time at
any place. Simply tracking a compromised host can hardly expose the botmaster.
Moreover, disabling a certain number of bots does no substantial harm to the botnet
as a whole. Thus, botnet detection approaches designed specically for centralized
botnets become less eective for decentralized botnets. Also, given dierent C&C
infrastructures the botmaster can employ, a detection mechanism targeting one C&C
instance is not sucient.
Last but not least, to date, although almost all botnets have been targeting per-
sonal computers (PCs), attackers are constantly searching for new opportunities such
as new platforms to host botnets. We should be aware that defense techniques tar-
geting state-of-the-art PC-based botnets are likely to be outsmarted when botnets
move to a new domain. As the popularity of smartphones such as the iPhone and
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Android-based phones grows rapidly, we expect that the botnets are likely to invade
smartphones sooner or later. Similar to PC-based botnets, mobile botnets also re-
quire three key components: propagation, C&C and topology. Considering the unique
features mobile devices have, mobile botnets could take advantage of such features
to be more stealthy and resilient to disruption. First, mobile devices can communi-
cate via multiple vectors including SMS/MMS messages, Bluetooth, aside from the
conventional IP network. Second, mobile devices move around frequently, and it is
generally dicult to nd vantage points that can observe all devices' activities. Third,
current smartphone users tend to download and share many third-party applications
and user-generated contents, but compared to PCs, smartphones have insucient
security protection features, opening doors for cyber crimes. These features together
present a good opportunity for future botnets to exploit. Thus, it is important to take
the attacker's perspective and think ahead on how to construct the mobile botnets
and how to defend against them before they become reality.
1.2 Research Goals
To address these challenges, this dissertation proposes solutions to detect current
and next-generation botnets. There are three goals we would like to achieve while
designing these solutions.
1. We have observed that bots conduct malicious activities in a coordinated man-
ner so that they demonstrate similar behavior and could distinguish themselves
from benign programs or hosts. To successfully combat bots that employ obfus-
cation techniques, our solutions need to capture invariant properties of botnet
behavior without relying on string signatures of binaries or packet payloads.
2. Since state-of-the-art botnets are able to utilize various types of C&C, our solu-
tions should be general enough to detect dierent botnets instead of targeting
4
a specic botnet instance and could be extended to counter next-generation
botnet threats.
3. Depending on where the detector is deployed, activities that can be captured for
use of detection vary from one place to another. For example, in an end-host,
ne-grained, OS-level activities such as those in the le system and network
stack are all visible, whereas in the Internet infrastructure only trac ow
summaries without packet contents could be recorded. Our solutions must take
into consideration the availability of information at dierent scales (the host,
the edge network and the Internet infrastructure) and make the most of the
available information to enhance detection accuracy.
1.3 Overview of Existing Approaches
In the literature, numerous approaches have been proposed to detect and mitigate
the botnet threat targeting PCs. We briey overview them based on where the
detector is deployed: in the host or in the network.
 Host-Based Detection: A bot-infected host behaves similarly to other malware-
infected hosts, so general host-based malware detection approaches can be ap-
plied. Such approaches either use signature matching or behavior analysis.
The latter is of more interest as it can be immune to malware polymorphism
and obfuscation. Some behavior-analysis approaches rely on static analysis or
examination of executables, such as [34] and [57]. Semantics-aware detection
[34] tries to characterize dierent variations of worms by looking for semanti-
cally equivalent instructions in malware variants. In [57], a static analysis is
used to identify particular system calls or Internet Explorer API calls that are
predened as malicious. In terms of constructing behavior features, observing
system call sequences to identify anomalies is a common approach. Many host-
5
based behavioral approaches [39, 75, 80] focus on proling the normal behavior
by system call sequences and looking for deviations for detection. There are
also eorts leveraging runtime analysis. For example, Lee et al. [58] collected
a sequence of application events at run-time and constructed an opaque object
to represent the behavior for further clustering.
 Network-Based Detection: Most existing network-based solutions target
centralized botnets, i.e., IRC-based and HTTP-based. Gu et al. [45] used a
network-based anomaly detection to identify centralized botnet C&C channels
based on their spatial-temporal correlation. Binkley et al. [29] combined an IRC
mesh detection component with a TCP scan detection heuristic. Rishi [43] is a
detection system that relies on IRC nickname matching. Karasaridis et al. [56]
proposed the detection of botnet controllers by ow aggregation and feature
analysis. Livadas et al. [60, 83] utilized supervised machine learning to classify
network packets in order to identify the C&C trac of IRC-based botnets. As
P2P botnets emerged, researchers studied the Storm botnet and proposed ap-
proaches tailored to P2P-based botnet detection. Holz et al. [48] measured the
size of the Storm botnet by inltrating through a crawler, and proposed mit-
igation strategies that introduce controlled peers to join the network to either
separate or pollute the content of the Storm network. Porras et al. [70] tried to
detect the Storm bot by constructing its dialogue lifecycle model and identify-
ing the trac that matches this model. All of the above-mentioned approaches
only apply to specic types of botnets requiring in-depth understanding of the
C&C proles prior to their detection. There are only a few general approaches.
BotMiner [44] is designed for protocol- and structure-independent botnet de-
tection. It clusters similar communication and malicious trac, and performs
cross-plane correlation to identify the hosts that share both patterns. TAMD
[96] aims to detect infected hosts within a network by nding those that share
6
common and unusual network communications.
Although most of network-based detection approaches aim to detect bot-infected
hosts, there is also a body of research that focuses on identifying botnet-based
hosting services, especially fast-ux domains in which the IPs associated with
these domains in the DNS (Domain Name System) records change frequently.
Such IPs normally belong to bots that serve as proxies or redirection servers,
the goal of which is to hide the phishing and malware delivery websites behind
the ever-changing network. Holz et al. [47] presented an empirical study of
fast-ux service networks (FFSNs) and developed metrics to eectively detect
FFSNs based on the number of unique A (address) records, NS (name server)
records and ASN (AS) records for a specic domain. By continuously mining
live data, Nazario and Holz [68] identied over 900 fast-ux domains, and also
measured their lifetimes and botnet sizes. Hu et al. [49] proposed a system
named RB-Seeker that incorporates NetFlow data, spam emails and DNS logs
to discover redirection domains.
Note that both of the host-based and network-based approaches have their advantages
and disadvantages. The host-based solutions can monitor, capture and analyze ne-
grained information in host systems. They are able to know exactly what is going
on in the system, so the detection can be targeted and more accurate. However,
it is susceptible to compromise by host-resident malware. On the other hand, the
network-based approaches are dicult to be subverted but may only have limited
view of the botnets, because only network activities are observable in the network.
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation proposes behavior-based botnet detection solutions at three dif-
ferent levels|the end host, the edge network and the Internet infrastructure|from
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a small scale to a large scale, and investigates the next-generation botnet targeting
smartphones. To serve multiple detection purposes, one of our solutions is host-
based, one is host-network hybrid and the last one is network-based. Figure 1.2 gives
an overview of the dissertation. Each piece of work is summarized as follows:
 Behavior-Based Worm Containment at the End Host: We start from
end hosts because bots are mostly created and spread by network worms from
host systems|they propagate by scanning hosts with the same vulnerabilities
or by sending emails with malicious attachments or links pointing to nefarious
websites. Cutting o such propagation is an important rst step in combating
the botnet threat. We thus design and implement a behavior-based per-process
containment framework on end-host systems. The framework leverages the dis-
tinction of OS-wide behavior between benign and malicious processes to gen-
erate corresponding trac-limit policies. The OS-level behavior patterns are
monitored and captured at the le system, Registry and network stack. These
patterns are further examined by a machine learning algorithm to quantify
their suspicion levels. Each suspicion level is nally transformed into a thresh-
old for trac limiting. Our evaluation results show that the proposed scheme
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can easily accommodate legitimate applications while eectively containing the
propagation of bots and other network worms. This is especially important
for mission/service critical systems, because when these systems are infected,
completely shutting them down would incur signicant loss. The limitation of
this host-based solution is that malware can go below our monitoring level and
manipulate the information received by our framework. If we can incorporate
some external information that is hard to be compromised such as network-level
information, it will be more eective.
 Botnet Detection Using Combined Host- and Network-Level Informa-
tion in the Edge Network: Considering that a host-based approach alone
may not be reliable enough, we shift our focus to the local network where bots
reside in to see if network-level information would be helpful. By studying bot-
nets' behavior, we nd that bots within the same botnet usually get the same
input from the botmaster and take similar actions thereafter. This coordinated
behavior is essential and invariant to all types of botnets irrespective of their
underlying C&C structures. Capturing such behavior would facilitate detec-
tion, but relying solely on network-level information only has a limited view of
botnets' behavior. We believe that incorporating both sources of information
will create a synergy. Based on two invariants of botnets|coordination at the
network level and malicious behavior at the host level, we design and develop a
C&C protocol independent botnet detection framework for edge networks. The
evaluation based on real-world traces demonstrates that the framework is able
to detect various types (IRC, HTTP and P2P) of botnets with minimal impact
on benign hosts, achieving low false alarm rates.
 Large-Scale Botnet Detection at the Internet Infrastructure: By moni-
toring and analyzing ne-grained host and network-level information, the combined-
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detection framework works well in small-scale networks, such as edge networks.
However, current botnet sizes are in the order of hundreds of thousands and
bots are distributed over dierent networks, only detection at the edge is un-
likely to harm the functioning of the entire botnet. Moreover, implementing the
combined-detection framework is impractical at a large scale. To substantially
disrupt a botnet, one must consider detection at a high level|the Internet in-
frastructure level|to identify as many bots as possible. Following this direction,
we construct three types of P2P botnet topologies, investigate the visibility of
the botnet overlay trac at dierent network components at the Internet in-
frastructure, measure the eectiveness of detection at such places by exploiting
the structural properties of P2P botnets, and evaluate dierent P2P structures'
capabilities of hiding the botnet trac. This thorough analysis allows us to
not only come up with detection strategies from defenders' perspective but also
suggest resilient overlay structures from the botnet design's or attackers' view-
point.
 The Next-Generation Botnet: The rapidly-growing popularity of smart-
phones attracts cyber attackers' attention. Envisioning possible future devel-
opment of cyber threats targeting smartphones, we devise a proof-of-concept
decentralized mobile botnet utilizing SMS messages for all C&C communica-
tions and a P2P structure to construct its topology. We simulate two P2P
topologies|the structured and the unstructured|for our mobile botnets with
200 nodes and 2000 nodes. We nd that the structured topology is a bet-
ter choice for mobile botnets in terms of message overhead, delay, and load-
balancing. As mentioned previously, mobile botnets share some common traits
with PC-based botnets, but also have their unique properties. With modica-
tions and extensions, our behavior-based botnet detection solutions aiming at
current botnets can be applied to counter this future threat as well.
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1.5 Contributions and Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation mainly makes the following contributions.
1. The botnet detection solutions proposed in this dissertation utilize intrinsic
and fundamental behavior of botnets: malicious OS activities at the host level,
coordination at the network level and structural topology at the Internet in-
frastructure level. Without relying on signatures of binaries or packet payloads,
these solutions are immune to malware obfuscation and trac encryption.
2. The detection solutions are general enough to identify dierent types of botnets,
not a specic botnet instance, requiring almost no a priori knowledge of C&C
protocol details. They can also be extended to counter future botnet threats.
For example, the host-based behavioral detection can be modied to deploy
to mobile devices to identify mobile malware. Another example is that the
principles of detection at the infrastructure level can be applied to 3G or 4G
cellular networks to capture mobile devices whose communication graphs have
structural properties.
3. The detection solutions function at multiple levels|the host, the edge network
and the Internet infrastructure|from a small scale to a large scale. They each
take a dierent perspective but are highly complementary to each other, forming
an integrated botnet detection framework.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II addresses the
problem of worm propagation that is used to seed botnets by devising a behavior-
based per-process containment scheme on end-host systems. Chapter III proposes a
C&C protocol independent framework for botnet detection in edge networks. Using
combined host- and network-level information, this framework is able to detect dier-
ent types of botnets with minimal impact on benign hosts. Chapter IV considers the
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scalability issue in botnet detection and exploits the structural properties of botnet
topologies from a graph perspective at a high level. It focuses on measuring dierent
network components' capabilities for large-scale P2P botnet detection at the Internet
infrastructure level. Chapter V presents the design of a next-generation botnet tar-
geting smartphones. The botnet employs SMS messages as C&C and utilizes a P2P
topology to be stealthy and resilient. Countermeasures against this threat are also
discussed in this chapter. Chapter VI concludes this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
Behavior-Based Worm Containment at the End
Host
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an exponential surge in both the number of network
worms and the severity of damage they have inicted [84]. Fast-spreading worms, such
as Blaster (2003), MyDoom (2004), Zotob (2005), Storm (2007), propagated at an
unprecedented rate and could infect most vulnerable systems within a short period
of time. The intent of a worm has evolved from simply replicating itself to installing
malicious payload in the victim systems for collecting condential information and
perpetrating other attacks. Current worms are mostly used to seed botnets, one of
the most serious security threats to the Internet and its end users. Worms propagate
either through vulnerability scanning or through social engineering schemes such as
sending out spam emails with malicious attachments or links pointing to nefarious
websites. For example, the Storm worm came out in early 2007; it spread via infected
email attachments and once accounted for 8% of all malware infections on Microsoft
Windows computers globally. Each compromised machine then merged into the well-
known Storm botnet under a decentralized P2P C&C. The Storm botnet remained
active for two years, infecting millions of machines to conduct spamming and DDoS
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attacks. Evidently, to nip the botnet in the bud, alleviating the problem of worm
propagation from end host systems is an important rst step.
To combat fast-spreading worms, numerous solutions have been proposed to de-
tect and automatically respond to worm outbreaks. A widely-used approach is the
signature-based detection, which looks for specic signatures (usually raw byte se-
quences) in the application executables. The disadvantage of this scheme is that it can
only detect previously-known worms and can be evaded even with simple variations
thereof. Behavior-based detection has recently received considerable attention due
to its capability of identifying new attacks [34, 39, 57, 75, 80, 88]. Most of prior work
requires direct analysis of the binaries [34, 57] or system call sequences [39, 75, 80].
Also, the purpose of behavior-based detection is to classify each application as mali-
cious or benign, which may result in high false-alarm rates due to the ambiguity of
behavior-matching.
For fast and eective containment of worms, an automatic response is of particular
interest because any method that requires human intervention is much slower than the
spreading speed of current worms. The detect-and-block approaches could eliminate
the human intervention in the loop, but they may not be an option for mission- or
service-critical systems such as air trac control systems, life support systems and
servers running critical business services. Obviously, when such systems are infected
by worms, immediately taking them oine will incur signicant loss to businesses
and even pose danger to peoples' lives. Under these scenarios, we would like to
contain the malicious network trac as much as possible and still keep the benign
services and applications running until the critical tasks are nished or taken over
by other healthy systems. That's why we resort to rate-limiting|an alternative
to the detect-and-block approaches. The main idea of rate-limiting is to block the
propagation of worms while allowing legitimate trac to go through, by dierentiating
trac patterns between legitimate applications and network worms. Rate-limiting
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cannot completely block worms, but can signicantly slow down the propagation of
(especially new) worms, allowing for other countermeasures to kick in.
A key element to worm containment is the selection of a metric based on which
the trac is rate-limited. Previous research results [33, 74, 93] suggest several metrics
derived from host-level network activities, such as distinct IP connection ratio, failed
connection ratio, the number of connections without DNS queries, etc. Another key
aspect of rate-limiting is the use of a threshold beyond which the outgoing trac
is blocked. Most existing containment schemes impose a static threshold rate on
the entire host, such as several distinct IP connections per second. Sekar et al. [76]
proposed use of dierent detection thresholds during dierent time windows for each
host. Rate-limiting on a per-host basis has advantages and drawbacks. The advan-
tages are: (1) the mechanism can be implemented in the network without the trouble
of deploying monitors in each host; (2) it is relatively dicult for malware to tamper
with the network trac statistics. The drawbacks are also obvious. First, rate-
limiting on the entire host is likely to cause both false-positives and false-negatives.
False-positives stem from the coarse-grained rate-limiting policies applied indiscrim-
inately to both normal and malicious processes. Legitimate trac will therefore be
aected signicantly during a worm outbreak. It is likely that all legitimate trac
is dropped because the amount of malicious trac exceeds the threshold, defeating
the purpose of rate-limiting. This is undesirable especially when infected mission- or
service-critical systems need to keep certain applications or services uninterrupted.
False-negatives may result from the evasion of detection by worms that have trac
patterns similar to that of normal applications. This is undesirable either. Second,
sometimes it is necessary to scrutinize where and how the worm infection starts and
pinpoint which application/process is responsible for that. Only monitoring trac
in the network can hardly provide such information. Fine-grained monitoring and
analysis is needed at the host level. This prompts us to consider per-process behavior
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in the worm containment to enhance rate-limiting accuracy.
We propose a per-process-based containment framework. We dene behavior at a
higher level than others: a sequence of events rather than that of system calls or API
calls. Moreover, the behavior proles of both worms and normal programs are char-
acterized to utilize the notion of anomaly as well as misuse analysis. Our framework
considers not only network activities but also a variety of notable behaviors common
to network worms, such as creating AutoRun Registry key, overwriting system direc-
tories, etc. To compensate for the inaccuracy of behavior analysis and make the best
of behavioral information, we use a machine-learning algorithm, instead of making
a clear-cut (binary) decision of malice or innocence, to assign a suspicion level to
each process based on the comprehensive analysis of its behavior. The suspicion level
is then transformed into a threshold to rate-limit the process. Since the generation
of a suspicion level incorporates many more process-related properties than network
activities alone, the containment scheme can make an accurate and exible decision
on how to rate-limit a process, thus lowering false-positive and false-negative rates.
2.1.1 Contributions
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we propose a framework incorporating
both behavior analysis and containment for automatic defense against fast-spreading
network worms. Our framework diers from others in that, instead of per-host rate-
limiting based solely on network activities, it incorporates a comprehensive analysis
of processes' behavior and performs customized rate-limiting on each process. This
ne-grained monitoring and analysis signicantly improve the eectiveness of rate-
limiting. Second, we apply a machine-learning classication algorithm to generate a
suspicion level for each process and develop a heuristic to nd an optimal function
that maps each suspicion level to a threshold for rate-limiting. Third, we conduct
in-depth analysis and simulation using the traces of real-world worm samples plus
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their variants and normal programs. Our evaluation results show that the proposed
scheme can easily accommodate legitimate applications while eectively containing
the propagation of network worms. Our ne-grained per-process thresholding can
achieve much lower false-positive and false-negative rates than the per-host approach.
2.1.2 Organization
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an
overview of our system architecture. Section 2.3 details the process-level behavior
analysis. Section 2.4 presents the principles of containment. Implementation and
evaluation results are presented in Section 4.4. Section 2.6 discusses the limitations
of our work and their solutions. This chapter concludes with Section 2.7.
2.2 System Architecture
Our framework (Figure2.1) primarily consists of two building blocks: behavior
analysis and containment. The behavior analysis component includes several sys-
tem monitors and a suspicion-level generator. Runtime behavior for each process is
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monitored at the OS level, such as Registry, le system and network stack. Pro-
cess correlation is tracked as well. The suspicion-level generator assigns a suspicion
level to each running process by applying the SVM algorithm based on the analy-
sis of its system-wide activities. The suspicion level links process-level behavior to
containment. For containment, the mapping function optimizer generates the most
appropriate function of transforming the suspicion level to a containment threshold.
Both the suspicion-levels and the mapping function are taken as the input to the
containment model which then outputs a customized threshold for each process. In
what follows, we will detail each component.
2.3 Behavior Analysis
The rst step to combat the propagation of worms is to identify processes conduct-
ing malicious activities in a host system. Previous containment techniques conne
themselves to network activities, such as high failure rate and the absence of DNS
query, in order to identify suspicious trac. In this paper, we employ behavior-based
analysis that focuses on application run-time behavior including Registry, le system
and network. By studying contemporary worms' behaviors, we have observed that
they do share certain behavior patterns (e.g., creating autorun registry key, scanning
random host IPs) that are dierent from normal applications.
2.3.1 Behavior Signature Specication
We dene a behavior signature as the description of an application's activities in
terms of its resource access patterns. Our goal is to develop a simple yet ecient
representation of application behavior that maximally dierentiates legitimate appli-
cations from worms so that suspicion-level information can be generated to facilitate
per-process containment. Note that a single activity|such as network access, a le
read or written during a worm's life time|alone may appear harmless, while the com-
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bination of these activities may reveal a malicious intent. We thus specify a behavior
signature as the aggregation of suspicious activities that can potentially be exploited
by network worms. To design an ecient specication of worm activities, we need to
extract the \common" behavior of network worms, which can be understood better
by looking at a few notable examples. From real-world worms and their variants,
we found that the worm actions can be grouped into 3 categories, taking place at
Registry, le system and network stack, where our behavior monitors are deployed.
Registry : A common target of worms is the AutoRun Key HKLM\Software \Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. Most, if not all, worms will add an entry under
this key to automatically run themselves when Windows starts up. Examples in-
clude Zotob, Win32-Blaster, and W32-Bozori. Some worms also create Registry
keys such as HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\Random_CLSID\ InprocServer32\(Default)
to conceal its backdoor by injecting into other processes. By setting this reg-
istry value to the name of the backdoor DLL le, some benign processes (in the
above case, explorer.exe) will load the DLL as an extension when the system
starts up, so that the backdoor is not visible as a separate process. For example,
Mydoom sets this registry key to be \shimgapi.dll"|a backdoor it dropped in
the system directory listening on a port between 3127 and 3198.
File System : Once a system is infected, a worm always downloads its payload
from the network to the local le system so that it can be activated again
when the system reboots. Almost all worms choose the system directory (e.g.,
C:\WINDOWS) as an ideal place to drop themselves, because normal users seldom
inspect the system directory and the worm payload is less noticeable among
thousands of system les. For instance, Win32-Mydoom creates taskmon.exe
and Win32-Bobax drops bleh.exe into the system directory. Both of them
change the registry key to make these two les automatically execute. Based
on this observation, we closely monitor the create and write accesses in system
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Table 2.1: Index of behavior vectors
Index Signature Description
0 Number of First-Contact Connections
1 DNS-to-Connection Ratio
2 Number of Suspicious Ports
3 Average Packet Length
4 Number of Packets
5 Modify Dll in System Dir
6 Modify EXE in System Dir
7 Modify other les in System Dir
8 Create Dll to System Dir
9 Create EXE to System Dir
10 Create other les to System Dir
11 Create AutoRun key in Registry
12 Set AutoRun key Value in Registry
13 Create DLL injection key in Registry
14 Set DLL injection key Value in Registry
directories.
Network : This category of actions are taken by self-propagating worms, whose
goal is to infect as many hosts as possible. For example, Blaster probes 20
hosts at a time using a sequential scanning algorithm with a random starting
point. Zotob creates 300 threads to connect to random IP addresses within the
B-class network of the infected system. Slammer simply generates UDP packets
carrying copies of itself at the host's maximum rate. Thus, intensive network
accesses are a good indicator for scanning activities.
Note that none of the above activities is inherently malicious, because they are also
performed frequently by many normal applications. However, the combination and
accumulation of these activities are essential to the detection of malicious intents with
a high degree of condence, as very few legitimate applications will conduct these
activities altogether and intensively. We thus construct a vector of behavior features
for each process. we also consider process correlation to defend against sophisticated
worms that create multiple processes upon execution, which we will describe later.
Each feature in the behavior vector represents one type of application behavior of
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interest. Table 2.1 summarizes these behavior features that constitute the signature
vector. In addition to the behaviors that fall directly into the above three categories,
we also take advantage of some auxiliary network features that dierentiate worm
activities from normal ones. These include DNS-to-connection ratio, suspicious port,
and average packet length. The DNS-to-connection ratio is of interest to us because
most worms scan random IP addresses without DNS queries. The average packet
length also provides a hint for suspicious behavior, as worms usually send many
identical short packets for both eciency and fast propagation. Number of suspicious
ports records the number of connections initiated by the process to a set of potential
vulnerable ports such as 135 and 445. Each behavior feature is associated with a
numeric value indicating the number of occurrences of that behavior. The high-level
behavior signature for a process is constructed as a vector of all the features, which
is then used to determine the suspicion level of the process.
2.3.2 Suspicion-Level Generator
To respond quickly to fast-spreading (especially previously unknown) worms, we
build our behavior analysis upon the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [55, 87] that
learns the behavior models from both normal and malicious behavior signatures. We
collect behaviors from normal applications and worms and generate the corresponding
behavior vectors as training data. The SVM algorithm maps training data into a
higher-dimensional feature space using a kernel function and determines the maximal
margin hyperplane to best separate normal data from malicious data. The hyperplane
corresponds to the classication rule. Given a test sample, the SVM calculates the
distance of the sample from the separating hyperplane with a sign indicating which
class (malicious or benign) the test sample belongs to.
Previous research focused on the binary (malicious or benign) classication and
the results are likely to be inaccurate because of the learning procedure. To make the
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best of the learning model, we calibrate the distance score to a posterior classication
probability, which determines how likely a test example belongs to a certain class [59].
The posterior probability is then directly translated into the suspicion level between
0 and 1 where 0 (1) means benign (malicious). Apparently, the higher the suspicion
level, the more likely the process is malicious, and thus, a stricter containment action
should apply. The extension from binary classication to a suspicion level facilitates
customization of the containment method for each process. Worm trac is more
likely to be strictly rate-limited while legitimate applications will experience a minor
trac-limiting impact.
It is important to note that our suspicion-level generation is not a one-time rating
but a periodic check. It can capture all of runtime behaviors of interest and provide
a suspicion level for each process during every time window. Thus, a worm that
replaces its process ID with a normal program or attaches itself to a normal program
is unlikely to aect our decision. For example, if the Internet Explorer (IE) is the
target of the worm, its suspicion level will be high as long as it exhibits some bad
behaviors, and its trac will thus be contained. Some legitimate trac from IE may
be aected, but the process-level containment is the nest-grain one can achieve.
2.3.3 Process Correlation
Most worms to-date behave badly on their own, while some sophisticated worms
may have multiple processes collaboratively conduct malicious activities. To defend
against such a worm whose single processes are not malicious enough to trigger ef-
fective rate-limiting, we account for process correlation while building the behavior
vectors. We track the inter-process relationships and aggregate the behaviors from
correlated processes. The behavior vectors are the same for correlated processes such
as a parent process and its children. Accordingly, the whole group of correlated pro-
cesses is assigned the same suspicion level. By maintaining a white list, we can easily
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exclude some normal processes with correlation such as services and svchost. Thus,
it is not dicult to identify a group of processes behaving maliciously altogether.
2.3.4 Behavior Accumulation
Since the suspicion level is generated every time window, a worm can hide itself
by appearing benign for each window but malicious overall. In other words, it may
spread suspicious behavior over dierent time windows or reduce the intensity of
malicious activities within a single window, thus decreasing its suspicion level. To
deal with such worms, we selectively accumulate the value in each eld of the behavior
vector. The behavior features worth accumulation are those seldom seen from normal
programs, such as creating an autorun key in the Registry or dropping a dll into the
system directory, etc. As for some behavior shared by both normal and malicious
programs such as outgoing connections, we do not accumulate the value in order
not to increase false-positives. The accumulation is straightforward. For example, a
worm registers an autorun entry in the registry in window 0 and drops a backdoor
in the system directory in window 1. Suppose the behavior vector's rst two elds
are hautorun key; dll drop; : : :i. The vector in window 1 will be h1; 1; : : :i instead of
h0; 1; : : :i. This way, even if a worm does only one bad thing in each time window
to lower its suspicion level, the suspicion level will nally increase as more malicious
activities are exhibited. This mechanism also works for a worm spawning multiple
processes with each exhibiting malicious activities in dierent time windows.
As we do not have such a real-world worm sample available, to evaluate the
accumulation scheme we simulated a worm in experiment to illustrate the dierence
of suspicion level between the original and the accumulated scheme. The results are
in Section 4.4.
We will next present a model and an algorithm used to transform the suspicion
level to an appropriate containment threshold.
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Figure 2.2: Static threshold vs. per-process threshold
2.4 Per-Process Containment
The containment scheme seeks to rate-limit the propagation of network worms
while allowing for the operation of normal programs on a host. As mentioned earlier,
each process's suspicion level is computed for a time window based on the activi-
ties observed during the last time window. This suspicion-level information is then
mapped to a threshold. The threshold indicates a connection rate value beyond which
the outgoing connections will be blocked. The threshold for each process changes as
a process's runtime behavior diers during each time window.
2.4.1 The Mapping Function
The key element in our approach is how to map each suspicion level to a threshold
beyond which the process is rate-limited. This mapping function can be of any form
but should have a common property; the set of thresholds for processes with higher
suspicion levels should be lower and for those with lower suspicion levels should be
higher. The rationale behind this is that when the suspicion level for a process is
high (low), we would like to block its outgoing trac as much (little) as possible. The
mapping function should therefore be monotonically decreasing within [0,1]. Any type
of functions satisfying this property can be used for our purpose. For computation
and comparison convenience, linear functions are adopted in our model. Actually,
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linear functions are found to work well in Section 4.4. Specically, we choose t =
h(l) = c + 0:5  a  a  l; a; c  0; l 2 [0; 1] as the class of mapping functions (Figure
2.2), where t denotes the threshold, l is the suspicion level, and a and c are two design
parameters. The smaller the a, the less suspicion-level information is used. When the
slope a! 0, it is equivalent to using a static threshold to all processes, ignoring the
suspicion level. Parameter c reects the tolerance to the false-positive rate. Given a,
the larger the c, the higher thresholds assigned to all processes. Given the form of the
mapping function, it is crucial to choose appropriate values of a and c. The criteria
for the ecacy of containment are false-positive and false-negative rates. To calculate
the false alarm rates, we develop a probabilistic model by assuming certain properties
of normal and malicious processes in order to obtain false-positive and false-negative
proles in terms of a and c. Based on the false alarm proles, an optimization
algorithm is designed to nd the appropriate parameters for the mapping function.
Our model and algorithm are presented next.
2.4.2 Modeling False Alarms
2.4.2.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions are used in this model.
1. A process is either normal or malicious.
2. The suspicion level across all processes could be treated as a random variable
denoted by L0 (L1) for normal (malicious) processes, where L0; L1 2 [0; 1].
L0(L1) has cdf F0(F1) and pdf f0(f1).
3. A mapping function h is from L(L = L0 or L1) to T (threshold). The threshold
for normal (malicious) processes is denoted by T0 (T1).
4. First-contact outgoing connection (connection to an address the sender has not
recently contacted) rates denoted by R0 for normal and R1 for malicious pro-
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Table 2.2: Connection-rate statistics
Average Standard
Conn Rate Deviation
Normal 1.75 1.40
Malicious 6.08 5.00
cesses follow certain distributions: Fconn0(fconn0) for normal and Fconn1(fconn1)
for malicious processes. Those connections are of interest because malicious
programs tend to reach as many hosts as possible while normal programs have
the \locality" property in outgoing trac.
2.4.2.2 Data Analysis
We estimated the distributions of rst-contact outgoing connections based on real-
world traces. For normal programs, we used attack-free network trac by tcpdump
that lasts 17187 seconds, including 585,000 frames. We have selected all new connec-
tions initiated, and ltered out other trac. The connection rate is dened as the
number of connections per second. For malicious programs, due to relatively limited
access to the real-world network worms, we collect network activities from 10 types
of worms and some of their variants. We set up 3 virtual machines connected via a
virtual network as our test-bed to collect the network activity data. The connection
rate CDFs are shown in Figure 2.3. We nd that 60% of the normal programs' con-
nection rates are around 1/s and 100% of their rates are below 7/s. On the other
hand, 50% of malicious programs' connection rates concentrate in the range from 5/s
to 8/s. The average and standard deviation across all normal and malicious processes
are given in Table 2.2. Clearly, worm's connection rate is, in general, higher than
that of normal programs reecting the fast propagation of network worms.
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Figure 2.3: Connection-rate CDFs
2.4.2.3 False-Alarm Equations
A false-positive occurs when the connection rate of a normal process exceeds its
threshold. A false-negative occurs when the connection rate of a malicious process is
below its threshold. If the threshold is static for all processes in a host, it can not
eectively contain worms and accommodate normal applications at the same time.
Our proposed rate-limiting is to assign each process with a customized threshold,
which is much ner-grained. To compare it against static threshold approach in
terms of false alarms, we derive the false-alarm equations for both approaches. Those
equations are represented by the parameters dened in Section 2.4.2.1. In the static
threshold's case, let c denote the constant threshold, then
False-positive: Pr(R0  c) = 1  Fconn0(dc  1e)
False-negative: Pr(R1 < c) = Fconn1(dc  1e)
False-positive and false-negative equations for per-process containment are calculated
as follows. The threshold in this case is a random variable, rather than a constant,
since L is a random variable and h(L) = T .
False-positive:
Pr(R0  T0) = Pr(T0  R0) =
1X
r=0
Pr(T0  r) Pr(R0 = r)
=
1X
r=0
FT0(r)fconn0(r): (2.1)
27
Note that FT0 is the CDF of T0 when the process is normal and h(l) = t. We also
know L0 has CDF F0 and pdf f0 for normal processes. By the Change of Variables
Theorem [4],
fT0(t) = f0(h
 1(t))
1
h0(h 1(t))
t 2 [h(1); h(0)]
FT0(t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 t < h(1)R t
h(1)
f0(h
 1(t)) 1
h0(h 1(t))dt t 2 [h(1); h(0)]
l t > h(0)
Similarly, false-negative:
Pr(R1 < T1) = Pr(T1 > R1) =
1X
r=0
Pr(T1 > r) Pr(R1 = r)
=
1X
r=0
(1  FT1(r))fconn1(r): (2.2)
FT1(t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 t < h(1)R t
h(1)
f1(h
 1(t)) 1
h0(h 1(t))dt t 2 [h(1); h(0)]
l t > h(0)
Each pair of a and c determines a mapping function. We plug in the connection-
rate and suspicion-level distributions as well as the mapping function into the equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2) to calculate the false-positive and false-negative rates. Since a
pair of a and c corresponds to a pair of false-positive and false-negative, by varying
the values of a and c, we can plot a set of false-alarm proles. As shown in Figure
2.4, given a, as the value of c decreases from 14 to 1, the curve descends from the
upper-left to lower-right direction meaning that the more restrictive the threshold
(the smaller the c), the higher the false-positive and the lower the false-negative,
showing a tradeo between the two. Fixing the same set of c from 1 to 14, we vary
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Figure 2.4: Static threshold vs. per-process false alarm proles
a's value and generate a curve for each a. When a > 0 (we only draw a = 6:51 and
a = 9 for illustration), meaning that we make use of the suspicion-level information
and assign each process a customized threshold, the curves are always below the static
threshold approach (i.e., a = 0). In other words, given a false-positive rate, the a > 0
curves can always achieve lower false-negative rates than a = 0 curve does, indicating
that using per-process suspicion-level information results in an improved false alarm
curve.
2.4.3 Mapping Function Optimization
To nd the most appropriate mapping function for a specic host system, we
develop an optimization algorithm. The required false-positive rate is the input to
the optimization algorithm that determines a and c to obtain the lowest false-negative
rate. We impose a constraint on the false-positive rate because users are aected most
by this rate. But this conguration is tunable such that false-negative rate could also
be constrained. Since it is dicult to derive explicit equations for a and c, we devise a
heuristic algorithm based on the observation of the numerically-obtained false alarm
curves. One property of the curve is that given a, the larger the c, the lower the
false-positive rate. Another property is that given c, there is an optimal a that could
achieve the lowest false-positive. Our algorithm consists of adjustment (steps 1{3)
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and renement (steps 4{6). The rst phase searches for the curve to the lowest-left
direction, while the second phase helps to jump out of the local optimum facing the
rst phase, if any.
1. (Adjust): given the initial a and c, increase or decrease c to achieve the target
false-positive rate.
2. (Adjust): x c at the value obtained from step 1, increase or decrease a to reach
the lowest false-positive rate.
3. (Adjust): repeat steps 1 and 2 until a cannot be changed any further.
4. (Rene): increase or decrease a if a lower false-negative rate can be achieved.
5. (Rene): adjust c to the target false-positive rate.
6. (Rene): repeat steps 4 and 5 until the lowest false-negative rate is reached.
The pseudocode for this algorithm is given below.
adjust c(&a;&c; Fconn0; targetFP )
1 if FP(a; c; Fconn0) > targetFP
2 then step EPSILON
3 else step  EPSILON
4 while FP(a; c; Fconn0) > targetFP
5 do c c+ step or c c  step
6 adjust a(a; c; Fconn0; targetFP )
adjust a(&a;&c; Fconn0; targetFP )
1 currenta a
2 currentFP  FP(a; c; Fconn0)
3 if FP(a+ step; c; Fconn0) < currentFP
4 then step EPSILON
30
5 else step  EPSILON
6 while FP(a+ step; c; Fconn0) < currentFP
7 do a a+ step
8 currentFP  temp
9 if a  currenta < EPSILON
10 then return
11 adjust c(a; c; Fconn0; targetFP )
refine a(&a;&c; Fconn0; Fconn1; targetFP )
1 repeat
2 currentFN  FN(a; c; Fconn1)
3 if FN(a+ EPSILON; c; Fconn1) < currentFN
4 then a a+ EPSILON
5 if FN(a  EPSILON; c; Fconn1) < currentFN
6 then a a  EPSILON
7 if FN(a+ EPSILON; c; Fconn1) == currentFN
8 then return
9 refine c(a; c; Fconn0; targetFP )
10 until FN(a; c; Fconn1) > currentFN
refine c(&a;&c; Fconn0; targetFP )
1 if FP(a; c; Fconn0) > targetFP
2 then step EPSILON
3 else step  EPSILON
4 while FP(a; c; Fconn0) > targetFP
5 do c c+ step or c c  step
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The EPSILON is set to be 10 2 and the call sequence is:
adjust c(a,c,Fconn0,targetFP)
rene a(a,c,Fconn0; Fconn1,targetFP)
2.5 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented four behavior monitors: Registry Activity Monitor (RAM),
File Activity Monitor (FAM), Network Activity Monitor (NAM), and Process Corre-
lation Monitor (PCM). These monitors capture each process's behavior in real time.
The traces collected by these monitors are fed to our trace-driven simulation of the
proposed framework. The traces were collected from 20 real-world worms plus some
of their variants that are representative and reect the evolution of contemporary
worms and 49 normal programs. We used a C++ implementation of SVM learn-
ing algorithm, called LibSVM [31], in the behavior analysis component and derived
suspicion-level distributions for normal and malicious processes. We also tested the
containment scheme's false-positive and false-negative rates in evaluation.
2.5.1 System Monitors
The architecture of RAM resembles that of Sysinternals' Regmon [18]. RAM was
implemented on Windows NT/XP, including a user-level logging application and a
kernel device driver which implemented the system-call hooking technique [2]. RAM
intercepts registry-related system calls and stores passed parameters and other status
information in a kernel buer which is then periodically copied to the user-level
application. RAM logs complete information about every registry activity for all
processes running on a host, including timestamp, process name, process ID, request
type (create key, set key value, etc.) and path of the registry key. The implementation
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of FAM is similar to that of RAM. It records system-wide le-system activities in real
time. NAM is implemented based on WinPcap library, and continually monitors all
incoming and outgoing packets of the host. With WinPcap's support, NAM provides
information on active connections (e.g., source address, port, destination address port,
process ID, etc.) and dynamically correlates each captured packet with the process
that initiates this connection. The data collected by NAM consists of timestamp,
process name and ID, connection type (TCP or UDP) and detailed packet header.
PCM uses the same technique as Sysinternals' Process Explorer [16]. The idea is to
call a Windows Native API named NtQuerySystemInformation. This API retrieves
an array of SYSTEM PROCESS INFORMATION structures for processing running
in the system, in which each process's parent ID can be obtained. Another set of
Windows APIs, Process Structure Routines, are used to track process creations and
terminations. These four monitors together characterize the detailed behavior of
all the running processes, which will be formalized into behavior feature vectors to
determine the per-process suspicion level by the machine learning algorithm.
2.5.2 Trace Collection
To collect worm traces in real time, we set up 3 virtual machines running Windows
XP systems connected via a virtual network as our test-bed. We also set up a DNS
server at the host machine to collect DNS statistics and congured it as the default
gateway for the virtual machines. By studying recent worm behaviors, we selected
20 real-world worms and their variants. The samples include notable worms such as
Blaster, MyDoom, Storm, etc. We ran the worm samples on our test-bed, gathering
their process correlation, le system, registry and network activities. The length of
trace for each worm is approximately 20 minutes. The normal traces were collected
from malware-free PCs in regular use. We selected applications with network access,
such as P2P, web browser, le download, etc. The traces captured the activities of 49
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normal processes which cover most commonly-used network applications, including
eMule, IE, refox, sshclient, utorrent, etc., and each lasted 20 minutes as well. We did
not capture longer traces because most applications show relatively stable behavior.
We used part of both normal and worm traces to train the SVM to build proles and
the rest as our test set. We intentionally selected variants of some worm samples into
the test set and the original worms in the training set. The accuracy of the learning
algorithm with regard to suspicion-level generation is demonstrated in Section 2.5.4.
2.5.3 Trace Formalization
We extracted useful features from the le system, registry and network activity
logs, and formalized them to feature vectors in a uniform format that can be analyzed
by the learning algorithm. A feature vector has 15 dimensions, each of which corre-
sponds to an atomic behavior feature represented with a tuple <feature index:value>.
A detailed description of the behavior feature vector is given in Section 2.3.1. As de-
scribed earlier, we kept track of the process relationships. The behavior features are
aggregated across correlated processes. For example, process A registers an autorun
entry in the registry and creates process B. Process B then drops a backdoor in the
system directory within the same time window. Suppose the behavior vector's rst
two elds are hautorun key; dll drop; : : :i. Then, the vector in this window for both
will be h1; 1; : : :i instead of h1; 0; : : :i and h0; 1; : : :i.
In addition, we selectively accumulated some feature elds in consideration of the
worms that may spread malicious activities to dierent time windows. Because we
did not nd such a worm in the wild, we simulated one to show the dierence in
suspicion levels. Without feature accumulation, the suspicion level ranges from 0.027
to 0.59, and 7 out of 8 are below 0.5 (Table 2.3). With feature accumulation over
5 time windows, the suspicion level becomes 0.89. Note that the simulated worm
is slowly propagated compared to fast-scanning worms that can generate hundreds
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Table 2.3: Suspicion levels with and without feature accumulation
Time Behavior Original Accumulated
Window SusLevel SusLevel
win0 Write exe to sys dir 0.59 0.59
win1 Write a dll 0.36 0.68
win2 Create an autorun key 0.20 0.72
win3 Create an Inprocserver key 0.22 0.80
win4 Initiate 20 connections 0.16 0.89
win5 None 0.027 0.89
win6 Initiate 20 connections 0.16 0.89
win7 None 0.027 0.89
of connections in a time window. Even so, due to its accumulated le system and
Registry activities, its suspicion level is high enough to trigger a strict rate-limiting
when it accesses the network.
For this feature accumulation, we need to determine how long to accumulate
behavior for each process. If this time window of accumulation is static, an attacker
may learn and evade it. If we accumulate over innitely many windows, a total
number of false-positives may become very high. So, we dynamically change the
accumulation time window. For example, we randomly select a value between 1 and
50 min each time. By introducing this uncertainty, it makes evasion of behavior
monitoring harder.
2.5.4 Suspicion-Level Analysis
Recall that the suspicion level generated by the learning algorithm is denoted by
L0 for normal and L1 for malicious processes where L0; L1 2 [0; 1]. L0 (L1) has CDF
F0 (F1). We estimated the suspicion-level CDFs for normal and malicious processes
by applying the pre-trained SVM to the behavior vectors generated from the normal
and malicious traces. The suspicion-level CDFs are plotted in Figure 2.5. Clearly,
normal applications tend to have a lower degree of suspicion, while worms have much
higher suspicion levels. This demonstrates the SVM's learning ability in determining
the suspicion level of a process, and also indicates that the thus-generated suspicion
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Figure 2.5: Suspicion-level CDFs for malicious/normal processes
level is indeed informative.
2.5.5 Overhead
One may want to know the overheads incurred by the runtime behavior cap-
ture and the periodical suspicion-level generation. We used a common Windows
benchmark PassMark Software, PerformanceTest [14], to measure the overheads of
the runtime system monitors on a host machine with Intel(R) Pentium IV 1.5GHz
CPU, 512MB memory, 19.5G disk, and Windows XP operating system. We ran
the corresponding benchmark program for CPU, memory and disk, respectively, 5
rounds each. The average overhead for CPU is 10.5%, memory 14.5% and disk 4.7%.
Considering the fact that memory of this machine is much smaller than that of a
today's PC/laptop, all of these numbers are within an acceptable range. As to the
suspicion-level generation, since the classier is pre-trained (i.e., the support vectors
are pre-loaded), the training time will not incur any runtime overhead to the host.
Calculation of the suspicion level is fast. For example, the suspicion levels of 10
processes are generated within half a second.
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2.5.6 Trace-Driven Evaluation
We simulated the running of dierent worms and normal processes based on the
real traces collected. To demonstrate the ecacy of our scheme, Williamson's rate-
limiting [93] was implemented as a baseline in our evaluation. We specically com-
pared the performance between Williamson's and our per-process schemes when a
host was infected by the latest Storm worm. We also applied Williamson's, static-
threshold (i.e., processes have the same threshold) and our customized per-process
to all other test-set data we collected including worms, their variants and normal
programs, to show the performance dierences.
2.5.6.1 Case Study: Storm Worm
Storm worm (or W32.Peacomm, Nuwar, Zhelatin) spreads via email spam and is
known to be the rst malware to seed a botnet in a P2P manner without any central-
ized control. The instance we obtained was from the Storm outbreak on Valentine's
Day 2008. The trace shows that Storm rst connects to the P2P network by con-
tacting peers in a hard-coded peer list containing more than 100 IPs. After joining
the network, the bot sends out search requests to nd a specic secondary injection
for spamming. We observed that it started to behave as a SMTP server and to send
spam email in 5 minutes upon execution.
In our experiment, we applied both Williamson's rate-limiting and our per-process
schemes. Williamson's approach applied to the entire host. A working set of specied
size (n = 4 in our case, as commonly used by others) is maintained to keep track of
all IPs the host has contacted. When a new connection is initiated, the destination
IP is compared with those in the working set. If it is in that set, the connection can
pass through. Otherwise, it is placed in a delay queue and will be sent out later. At
periodic intervals (every second as Williamson proposed), one connection is dequeued
and a new destination address is added to the working set. There is a pre-determined
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Figure 2.6: False alarm proles for Storm worm under Williamson and our approaches
threshold for the delay queue. Whenever this value is exceeded, all new connections
are dropped.
We mixed the normal trace including P2P, web browser applications with storm
trace in the simulation of Williamson's per-host scheme. We varied the delay queue
threshold in each round to get a pair of false-positive and false-negative rates. In our
per-process scheme, we used the mapping function h(l) = c+0:5a al. The optimal
mapping is generated by the algorithm described in Section 2.4. We obtained several
pairs of false-positives and false-negatives via dierent mapping functions and then
drew the false alarm proles. Figure 2.6 compares false alarms of the two approaches,
showing that our scheme outperforms Williamson's. In Williamson's scheme, when
the delay queue threshold is set to a small value, Storm can saturate the delay queue
in tens of seconds, thus causing normal trac to be dropped. When there are some
network-intensive normal applications, the false-positive is considerable. Specically
in the experiment, the false-negative rate is controlled within 10% at the expense
of more than 70% false-positive rate. On the other hand, given a generous delay
queue threshold to accommodate normal trac, a majority of Storm's connections
can pass through too. The problem lies in treating all processes indiscriminately. In
per-process scheme, dierent thresholds are assigned to dierent processes accord-
ing to their suspicion levels. In the normal case, the average suspicion level for all
normal applications is around 0:3 despite that some network-intensive applications
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are included. On the other hand, Storm has acted maliciously at the Registry and
le system resulting in a suspicion level of 0:95 and hence a low rate-limiting thresh-
old. By imposing customized rate-limiting to Storm and normal trac, our scheme
achieves lower false-positive and false-negative rates.
2.5.6.2 Evaluation of Three Schemes
Note that Williamson's use of a per-host static threshold is slightly dierent from
the static-threshold approach mentioned before. The latter assigns the same threshold
to all processes, while the former does not discriminate at the process level. To
compare these two and our schemes, either false-positive or false-negative rate has
to be xed as there is always a tradeo between the two. We set the false-positive
rate to be 5% and input the parameters to the optimization algorithm. The resulting
optimal mapping function, which can generate the lowest false-negative rate is h(l) =
7:32 + 0:5  6:51   6:51  l(a = 6:51; c = 7:32). Based on the numerically-obtained
false alarm proles introduced in Figure 2.4, the static threshold rate is set to 8
per second to meet the false-positive rate requirement. Since a suspicion level is
generated for each process every t minutes (t is set to 1 in our experiment), the
threshold value calculated by the mapping function is also updated dynamically in
the order of minutes. While applying Williamson's scheme, we chose the well-adopted
parameters (working set length=4 and release rate of delay queue= 1 connection/s).
We varied the delay queue threshold imposed to mingled normal and worm traces to
nd the one that can reach a 5% false-positive rate. The appropriate value is found
to be 200.
Recall that the false-positive rate is dened as the fraction of normal connections
blocked. Figure 2.7 plots real false-positive rates for each normal program in the
test set under Williamson's, the static threshold, and the customized per-process
schemes. They have some uctuations process-wise but the average values are close
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Figure 2.8: False-negatives on worms
to 5% (see Table 2.4). Figure 2.8 shows the false-negative curve for each scheme. The
false-negative rate is calculated as the percentage of evaded connections of worms.
Given false-positive rates shown in Table 2.4, the average false-negative rate across all
worms under Williamson's scheme is the highest, 72.12%, and the per-process scheme
4.15%, the best. The static scheme produces 20.14%, in the middle. Williamson's
is even worse than the static threshold scheme for the following reason. During a
worm outbreak, the per-host delay queue is mostly occupied by the worm. When
the threshold is set to a larger value to accommodate normal applications, the worm
benets more, leading to a high false-negative rate. As for the static threshold scheme,
the threshold is assigned to each process, which is relatively small (in our case, 8 versus
200) and thus more restrictive, compared to the per-host threshold.
Although progress is made from the per-host to the static threshold scheme, our
customized per-process threshold can perform even better than the static threshold
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Table 2.4: Average FPs and FNs under three schemes
Avg FP Avg FN
Williamson 5.56% 72.12%
Static 4.87% 20.14%
Per-Process 3.24% 4.15%
scheme by using suspicion-level information. The suspicion levels for worms are rela-
tively high and their thresholds are accordingly low so that most of malicious connec-
tions may be blocked, whereas normal applications are assigned low suspicion levels
but high rate-limiting thresholds to let most trac pass through. Compared to the
customized threshold, the static threshold scheme must compromise one false alarm
rate for another. Thus, the customized per-process scheme performs best among the
three.
2.5.6.3 Optimality of the Mapping Function
We now want to show that the performance improvement from use of a static
threshold to a customized per-process threshold is not a coincidence and that the
mapping function used is optimal in the sense that it can achieve the lowest false-
negative rate given a false positive rate. We selected 12 pairs of a and c, i.e., 12
mapping functions, and measured the false-positives and false-negatives on the same
data set. Figure 2.9 plots the false-alarm proles for dierent a and c values based on
the real-world traces. As we expected, the curves are quite similar to the numerically-
computed false-alarm proles (Figure 2.4). The curve in the lower-left direction is the
one with the optimal a because given a false-positive rate, the false-negative rate on
this curve is always lower than other curves, and it is the same case when false-negative
is xed. In this gure, a = 6:51 is obviously better than smaller or larger values of a.
This is the value our optimization algorithm yielded. In particular, on this curve, c =
7:32 is the one close to our required false-positive rate 5%. This c value is also identical
to that generated from the optimization. Moreover, when a = 0 which represents the
static scheme, the false-negatives on this curve are generally higher than those on
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Figure 2.9: Optimality of the mapping function
other curves. All of these observations conrm that our empirical results obtained
from real-world traces are consistent with the numerical results obtained from false-
alarm modeling, indicating that the mapping function selected by the optimization
algorithm is indeed optimal and the per-process scheme performs signicantly better
than the static threshold scheme in terms of false-alarm rates.
2.6 Limitations and Fixes
In this section, we would like to discuss two fundamental limitations of not only
our scheme but all host- and behavior-based worm defense and response mechanisms.
The rst limitation is the circumvention of a pre-dened list of behaviors. Since
our behavior list that can best discriminate normal and malicious programs is based
on the study of existing network worms, our scheme works eectively for malicious
processes having typical \worm" behavior. Even if some worms change their behaviors
a little bit, such as installing in a dierent directory, our scheme can still work since
we account for a set of behavior features, not just one feature. As worms evolve, we
can simply extend or modify our behavior list of monitoring. However, if all of the
behaviors of a worm are the same as those of normal programs or completely dierent
from existing worms, we can hardly capture it. However, such a scenario will be rare
as our behavior list reects the fundamentals of network worm behavior.
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The second limitation is the vulnerability of a host-based mechanism to worms'
adaptivity. As mentioned before, there is always a tradeo between deploying worm
defense at the network and at the end-host systems. A network-based scheme is not
easy to be disabled by a worm but only gets coarser-grained information, i.e., network
activities on a host basis, resulting in less accurate and ecient response. A host-
based solution, on the other hand, can obtain ner-grained information and achieve
ner-grained and accurate response as we have demonstrated. This guarantees that
critical services and applications will remain uninterrupted even during an worm out-
break. Moreover, since in-host monitors keep track of run-time activities for each
process, when and how a system is infected can be traced back for further investiga-
tion. However, a worm can get around our scheme by sitting below the monitoring
level and modifying or subverting the information our monitor receives by using the
rootkit technique for example. One countermeasure is to search for the discrepancy
between the information returned by the Windows API or system calls and that seen
in the raw scan of the le system or Registry hive [20]. With the help of secure hard-
ware [26] or secure VMM [41], it is also possible to prevent or detect the rootkit from
altering the OS. Another possible evasion is that a worm can employ benign processes
to conduct malicious activities. For example, upon execution, a worm drops some
DLL les into the le system and registers a certain Registry key so that benign pro-
grams will automatically load these DLLs and do malicious activities for the worm.
In this case, simply tracking process creations and parent-child relationships will not
reveal the correlation between the benign process and the worm process. One possible
solution is to link the process that registers such a Registry entry with the process
that uses this entry, considering that our scheme already tracks the process injection
behavior at the Registry. This would add additional complexity to our framework.
We plan to study its feasibility and implications in the future.
While there is a possibility that a worm could attempt to evade our mechanism,
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in the evaluation section we have demonstrated how our system successfully contains
state-of-the-art worms that we were able to collet while minimizing the impact on
legitimate trac. Therefore, our approach at least raises the bar signicantly for
contemporary network worms.
2.7 Conclusion
We have proposed a novel automatic worm defense framework that combines per-
process behavior analysis and ne-grained containment. It automatically monitors
each process's runtime behavior and generates its level of suspicion by a machine
learning algorithm. A mapping algorithm is developed to transform the suspicion level
to the appropriate rate-limiting threshold on a per-process basis. Our experimental
evaluation based on real-world worm samples and normal process traces demonstrates
the ecacy of per-process rate-limiting, which produces much fewer false-positives and
false-negatives in containing network worms than previously-known approaches. In
the future work, we would like to further investigate the evasion schemes an advanced
worm can utilize to get around our approach and how to defeat such schemes. For
example, it is worth examining how to extend our framework to identify benign
processes that are exploited by worms to conduct malicious tasks and correlate them
with those worm processes.
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CHAPTER III
Botnet Detection Using Combined Host- and
Network-Level Information in the Edge Network
3.1 Introduction
Botnets have now become one of the most serious security threats to Internet
services and applications. Botnets can cooperatively mount Distributed-Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks, spamming, phishing, identity theft, and other cyber crimes.
To control a botnet, a botmaster needs a C&C channel to issue commands, and
coordinate bots' actions. Traditional botnets utilize the IRC or HTTP protocol as
their C&C infrastructure, which are vulnerable to a single-point-of-failure. That is,
once the central IRC or HTTP servers are identied and removed, the entire botnet
will be disabled. To overcome this weakness, attackers have recently shifted toward
a new generation of botnets utilizing decentralized C&C protocols such as P2P. This
C&C infrastructure makes detection and mitigation much harder. A well-known
example is the Storm worm [22] which spread via email spam and is known to be the
rst malware to seed a botnet in a P2P fashion. The rst Storm worm came out in
early 2007 and the attackers then constantly changed the malicious code to create
multiple variants. Another spambot Waledac, which came to the wild at the end
of 2008, also spread via spam emails and formed its botnet using a C&C structure
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similar to that of the Storm botnet. Some researchers pointed out that Waledac was
the new and improved version of the Storm botnet [67].
To date, most botnet-detection approaches operate at the network level; a major-
ity of them target traditional IRC- or HTTP-based botnets [29, 43, 45, 56, 60, 83] by
looking for trac signatures or ow patterns. We are aware of only one approach [44]
designed for protocol- and structure-independent botnet detection. This approach
requires packet-level inspection and depends solely on network trac analysis, un-
likely to have a complete view of botnets' behavior. We thus need the ner-grained
host-by-host behavior inspection to complement the network analysis. On the other
hand, since bots behave maliciously system-wide, general host-based detection can
be useful. One such way is to match malware signatures, but it is eective in de-
tecting known bots only. To deal with unknown bot inltration, in-host behavior
analysis [34, 39, 57, 75, 80] is needed. However, since some in-host malicious behavior
is not exclusive to bots and in-host mechanisms are vulnerable to host-resident mal-
ware, host-based approaches alone can hardly provide reliable detection results and
thus we need external, hard-to-compromise (i.e., network-level) information for more
accurate detection of bots' malicious behavior.
Considering the required coordination within each botnet at the network level and
the malicious behavior each bot exhibits at the host level, we propose a C&C protocol-
independent detection framework that incorporates information collected at both the
host and the network levels. The two sources of information complement each other
in making detection decisions. This framework is intended for use in edge networks
such as enterprise networks as it requires ne-grained information for analysis. The
framework rst identies suspicious hosts by discovering similar behaviors among
dierent hosts using network- ow analysis, and validates the identied suspects to be
malicious by scrutinizing their in-host behavior. Since bots within the same botnet
are likely to receive the same input from the botmaster and take similar actions,
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whereas benign hosts rarely demonstrate such correlated behavior, our framework
looks for ows with similar patterns and labels them as triggering ows. It then
associates all subsequent ows (action ows) with each triggering ow on a host-
by-host basis, checking the similarity among those associated groups. If multiple
hosts behave similarly in the trigger-action patterns, they are grouped into the same
suspicious cluster as likely to belong to the same botnet. Whenever a group of hosts
are identied as suspicious by the network analysis, the host-behavior analysis results
based on a history of monitored host behaviors are reported. A correlation algorithm
nally assigns a detection score to each host under inspection by considering both
network and host behaviors.
3.1.1 Contributions
Our work makes the following contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst framework that combines both network- and host-level information to
detect botnets. The benet is that it completes a detection picture by considering
not only the coordination behavior intrinsic to each botnet but also each bot's in-host
behavior. Moreover, we extract features from NetFlow data to analyze the similarity
or dissimilarity of network behavior without inspecting each packet's payload, pre-
serving privacy. Second, our detection relies on the invariant properties of botnets'
network and host behaviors, which are independent of the underlying C&C protocol.
It can detect both traditional IRC and HTTP, as well as recent P2P botnets. Third,
our approach was evaluated by using several days of real-world NetFlow data from a
core router of a major campus network containing benign and botnet traces, as well
as multiple benign and botnet data sets collected from virtual machines and regular
hosts. Our evaluation results show that the proposed framework can detect dierent
types of botnets with low false-alarm rates.
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Figure 3.1: System architecture
3.1.2 Organization
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of our
system architecture. Section 4.3 presents the proposed detection methodology and
implementation details. Section 4.4 demonstrates evaluation results. Section 3.5
discusses limitations. The chapter concludes with Section 5.6.
3.2 System Architecture
Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of our system, which primarily consists of three
components: host analyzer, network analyzer, and correlation engine.
As almost all of current botnets target Windows machines, our host analyzer is
designed and implemented for Windows platforms. The host analyzer is deployed at
each host and contains two modules: in-host monitor and suspicion-level generator.
The former monitors run-time system-wide behavior taking place in the Registry,
le system, and network stack on a host. The latter generates a suspicion-level by
applying a machine-learning algorithm based on the behavior reported at each time
window and computes the overall suspicion-level using a moving average algorithm.
The host analyzer sends the average suspicion-level along with a few network feature
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statistics to the correlation engine, if required. The network analyzer also contains
two modules: ow analyzer and clustering. The ow analyzer takes the ow data from
a router as input and searches for trigger-action botnet-like ow patterns among dif-
ferent hosts. It then extracts a set of features that can best represent those associated
ows and transforms them into feature vectors. Those vectors are then fed to the
clustering module that groups similarly-behaving hosts into the same cluster, assum-
ing them likely to be part of a botnet. Whenever a suspicious group of hosts are
identied by the network analyzer, their host analyzers are required to provide the
suspicion-level and network statistics to the correlation engine, which veries the va-
lidity of the host information by comparing the network statistics collected from the
network and those received from the host. The correlation engine nally assigns a
detection score to each host and produces a detection result.
3.3 Methodology and Implementation
Our framework consists of three main components: host analyzer, network ana-
lyzer, and correlation engine. Each of these components is detailed next.
3.3.1 Host Analyzer
The host-analyzer is composed of two modules: in-host monitor and in-host
suspicion-level generator.
3.3.1.1 In-Host Monitor
Each in-host monitor captures system-wide behavior in real time at dierent loca-
tions. By studying contemporary bots' behaviors, we have observed that they share
certain behavior patterns that are dierent from benign applications, and that their
behaviors can be grouped into 3 categories taking place at the Registry, le system
and network stack. For example, when infecting a computer, a bot rst creates an
exe or dll le in the system directory. It then registers an autorun key in the Registry
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to make itself run automatically whenever the host system boots up. It also injects
its code into other processes to hide its presence and disables anti-virus software and
the task manager, if necessary. Finally, it opens one or more ports for further commu-
nications and establishes connections with the botmaster or peers in order to launch
DDoS, spamming activities, etc. Note that a single activity mentioned above may
not be malicious because it is also likely to be performed by benign hosts. However,
the combination and aggregation of these activities can reveal that a host has been
infected, since chances are slim that a benign host conducts all of these activities.
Thus, the in-host suspicion-level analysis considers the behavior features altogether
while making decisions. The implementation of the in-host monitors was adapted
from the per-process monitors used in our previous work [97]. Every in-host monitor
consists of three sub-monitors. The sub-monitors at the Registry and le system im-
plemented system-call hooking that intercepts related-system calls, stores the passed
parameters and status information in a kernel buer, and then copies them to the
user-level application. The two sub-monitors log complete information of every ac-
tivity of interest, including timestamp, request type and path. The sub-monitor at
the network stack was implemented based on WinPcap library and monitors all in-
coming and outgoing trac of the host. It collects information including source and
destination IPs, ports, and the protocol.
To facilitate a further analysis, each host's run-time behavior is transformed into
a uniform format known as a behavior vector . Each behavior vector consists of 9
behavior features as shown in Table 3.1; these features are intrinsic to bot-infected
hosts. Each feature is represented by a tuple <feature index:value>. For example,
the rst tuple below means the host created 2 les in the system directory.
1:2 2:2 3:1 4:1 5:2 6:3 7:40 8:55 9:40 [00:10:51, 01:10:51] As each host's network
activities can be captured and analyzed at the network level, the in-host monitor
should focus on behaviors that can't be observed externally, such as le and Registry
50
Table 3.1: In-host behavior features
Index Behavior Features
1 DLL or EXE Creation in System Directory
2 Modication of Files in System Directory
3 Creation of AutoRun Key in Registry
4 Creation of Process Injection Key in Registry
5 Modication of Critical Registry Key
(Disabling taskmgr; Overriding antivirus, etc.)
6 Number of Ports Opened
7 Number of Suspicious Ports
8 Number of Unique IPs Contacted
9 Number of SMTP Flows
operations, to complement the network-level information. However, since a host is
vulnerable to being compromised, we need some information that can be obtained
both internally and externally to validate the integrity of the data provided by a
host. Therefore, we have added a few network features (feature 7 to 9) for in-host
monitoring; these features will be compared against the same features generated by
the network-level analyzer.
3.3.1.2 In-Host Suspicion-Level Generator
Given each host's behavior vector, we employ a supervised learning algorithm, or
the support vector machine (SVM), to quantify its suspicion level. SVM learns from
benign and malicious host behavior proles prior to predicting unlabeled behavior
vectors. Since bots' in-host behaviors are similar to other types of malware such as
network worms, we did not conne our training data to bot-infected hosts but also
included other malware-infected ones. Benign hosts' training traces were obtained
directly from malware-free hosts in normal use. Based on the training data, the SVM
creates a hyperplane corresponding to a classication rule. Given a new behavior
vector, the SVM estimates the distance of the sample from the hyperplane and decides
which class it belongs to. Note that the training data were completely dierent from
the test set in the evaluation. To make the most of this learning model, we calibrate
the distance score to a posterior classication probability indicating how likely a test
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behavior vector belongs to a particular class [59]. The posterior probability is then
translated into the suspicion level in [0, 1] where 0 is benign and 1 is bot-infected.
The higher the suspicion level, the more likely it is bot-infected.
Since the suspicion level for each host is generated at every time window, a bot
may intentionally reduce its suspicion level by spreading malicious activities into dif-
ferent time windows or even sleeping for a while. To counter such an evasion attempt,
we selectively accumulate the value in each eld of the behavior feature vector. The
features worth accumulation are those typical to bot-infected hosts, such as creating
an autorun key in the Registry or injecting a piece of code into another process. In
addition, we use the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) algorithm to
compute the average suspicion level at every time window. If Yn denotes the suspicion
level generated in the n-th time window, and Sn 1 is the estimated average suspicion
level at the (n  1)-th window, the estimated average at the n-th window is given by
Sn =  Yn+(1 )Sn 1 where  is a constant smoothing factor. We dene  as a
function of the time interval between two suspicion-level readings.  = 1  e  tn tn 1W
where tn   tn 1 is the length of the time window of generating suspicion levels and
W is the the period of time over which the suspicion level is averaged. We chose
tn   tn 1 = 10 and W = 60 minutes, meaning that the in-host generator produces a
suspicion level every 10 minutes and reports the average to the correlation engine on
an hourly basis. The moving average is thus expressed as
Sn = (1  e  16 )  Yn + e  16  Sn 1: (3.1)
3.3.2 Network Analyzer
Considering privacy concerns and computational costs, our network analyzer,
which operates on the network trac collected from a core router in a major cam-
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Table 3.2: Flow features
Index Flow Features
1 to 4 Duration Mean, Variance, Skewness and Kurtosis
5 to 8 Totalbytes Mean, Variance, Skewness and Kurtosis
9 to 12 Number of Packets
Mean, Variance, Skewness and Kurtosis
13 Number of TCP Flows
14 Number of UDP Flows
15 Number of SMTP Flows
16 Number of Unique IPs Contacted
17 Number of Suspicious Ports
pus network, only requires analysis of NetFlow [13] data without accessing packets'
payload. NetFlow is a network protocol developed by Cisco for summarizing IP traf-
c information . A ow is dened as a sequence of packets between a source and
a destination within a single session or connection. A NetFlow record contains a
variety of ow-level information, such as protocol, source/destination IP and port,
start and end timestamps, number of packets, and ow size, but has no packet con-
tent information. The network analyzer takes ow records from the router as input
and generates host-clustering results. It consists of two modules: ow analyzer and
clustering, which were implemented in Perl and R.
3.3.2.1 Flow Analyzer
The ow analyzer processes the ow records of all hosts in a network to extract
trigger-action patterns of interest. Recall that bots within the same botnet usually
receive the same input from botmasters and take similar actions thereafter. Such
coordinated behaviors are essential and invariant to all types of botnets regardless of
their C&C structures.
The rst step in ow processing is to lter out irrelevant ows including internal
ows and legitimate ows. Internal ows represent trac within a network. Legiti-
mate ows are those with well-known destination addresses such as Google and CNN
which seldom function as C&C servers. Note that ow ltering is just an optional
operation and not essential to our network analyzer. It is only used to reduce the
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total number of ow records, and thus, the computational cost. It turns out that
the NetFlow data obtained from the core router in our campus network contained
an average of 3,900,000 ows per hour, and that the number could be reduced to an
average of 25,000 ows including 2,000 hosts per hour after ltering.
In the second step, our analyzer searches for trigger-action patterns at each time
window. In the monitored network, it looks for suspicious ows with the same des-
tination IP and protocol across all hosts which are presumably receiving commands,
and labels them as triggering ows. We found that bots within the same botnet all
connect to the same set of IPs. Evidently, IRC- and HTTP-based bots talk to their
C&C servers. In the hybrid-P2P-based case, Storm instances bootstrap by connecting
to the IPs in a hard-coded list, making their contacted IP lists look alike. Waledac in-
stances demonstrate a similar behavior. On the contrary, benign hosts rarely visit the
same IP with the same protocol after we lter out the internal and legitimate ows.
It is therefore reasonable to associate all of the ows that follow each triggering ow
on a host-by-host basis within a time window. These associated ows are considered
action ows initiated by triggering ows. Our analyzer then extracts a set of features
from each associated ow group to transform it into a ow feature vector for ease of
clustering. There is a possibility that benign hosts visit the same IP with the same
protocol. Even so, since their ow patterns are usually dierent, they cannot form
clusters among themselves. We detail this scenario in Section 3.4.4.
Since a ow record is only a brief summary of a session or a connection, the in-
formation provided is limited. We make the most of the information by selecting
17 features to constitute a ow feature vector which characterizes not only general
trac patterns but also distinction between benign and malicious hosts at network
level. We did so because selecting features essential to all types of botnets can make
clustering more eective and accurate, even if our clustering algorithm searches for
similarly-behaving hosts and does not require a priori knowledge of benign and mali-
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cious behaviors. Table 3.2 shows our selections which are mostly statistical features.
Features 1 through 14 characterize ow patterns only, which are the sample mean,
variance, skewness and kurtosis of ow duration, total bytes transferred, the number
of packets transferred, and TCP & UDP break-downs. Features 15 through 17, which
are also captured at host level for validation purpose, reveal bots' malicious intent to
some degree. Note that benign hosts seldom conduct above activities. Even if a group
of benign hosts visit the same destination themselves or the same as bot-infected hosts
do, and cannot be ltered out by the trigger-action association, they may be ruled
out by our clustering module because their network behaviors are usually dierent
among themselves and dierent from bot-infected hosts. Compared to bot-infected
hosts, benign hosts are less likely to take similar actions after visiting the same IPs
because they are not coordinated and commanded to do so.
3.3.2.2 Clustering
Using a vector representation, each associated group of ows becomes a ow fea-
ture vector at every time window; this facilitates the task of clustering. Our goal is
to group similarly-behaving hosts together by computing the closeness of their fea-
ture vectors. In the area of data clustering, two types of algorithms are available:
hierarchical and partitional. We use the hierarchical clustering because its clustering
result is deterministic and has a structure that is more informative than the result
generated by a partitional algorithm. Using the structured result, we can employ
a technique to nd a good cut of clustering. Specically, we use the pvclust pack-
age to calculate p-values via multi-scale bootstrap resampling for each cluster in the
hierarchical clustering. The p-value of a cluster is a value in [0, 1], indicating how
strong the cluster is supported by data. The package provides two types of p-values:
AU (Approximately Unbiased) p-value and BP (Bootstrap Probability) value. AU
p-value is computed by multi-scale bootstrap resampling, a better approximation to
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the unbiased p-value than the BP value computed by normal bootstrap resampling
[17]. For a cluster with AU p-value greater than 0.95, the hypothesis that \the cluster
does not exist" is rejected with a signicant level (equal to or less than 0.05). We
thus accept a cluster if its AU p-value is greater than 0.95.
3.3.3 Correlation Engine
As described earlier, whenever a group of hosts is identied by the clustering
module as a cluster, the respective host analyzers are required to report the suspi-
cion levels along with network statistics to the correlation engine, since the results
generated by ow analysis alone may not be accurate and further in-host validation
is needed. Given the two sources of information as input, the correlation engine
produces a detection result for each host.
Based on the consistency check of network statistics, there are two possibilities.
First, the network features sent from a host are falsied and dier from those ob-
served at the network level. In such a case, the correlation engine considers the host
compromised and generates the detection result immediately. Another possibility is
that the network-level results are consistent, then we need to consider both the in-
host suspicion-level and the quality of the clustering. The detection result should be
a function of these two parameters. It is straightforward that the higher the suspicion
level the more likely a host is part of a botnet. To quantify the contribution of the
clustering quality, we need a measure to reect the closeness of each host to its clus-
tered group. In other words, the more similar a host's network behavior is to other
hosts in the same cluster the more likely it is part of a similarly-behaving botnet.
This measure can be the average distance from a specic host to other hosts. We
used the \correlation" method to gauge the distance. We do not use other distance
measures because the correlation values in our data set are mostly positive. A study
[42] has shown that in this scenario, the \correlation" method performs best.
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Assume that a cluster consists of n hosts each of which is represented by a 17-
dimensional ow feature vector, forming a 17  n matrix X = fxijg. The i-th row
corresponds to the i-th feature of these hosts and the j-th column corresponds to a
ow feature vector. The distance between host u and host v is given by
Duv = 1 
P17
k=1(xku   xu)(xkv   xv)qP17
k=1(xku   xu)2
qP17
k=1(xkv   xv)2
:
where xu =
1
17
P17
k=1 xku and xv =
1
17
P17
k=1 xkv. As the correlation is always in the
range of [-1,1], Duv belongs to [0,2] and so does the average distance Dn.
Now, we have two parameters in the correlation algorithm. One is the suspicion
level Sn, and the other is the average distance Dn. The nal detection score is denoted
by Scoren and given by
Scoren = w1  Sn + w2  f(Dn): (3.2)
f is a function that maps each average distance Dn to a value in [0,1], having the
same range as that of Sn. w1 and w2 are weight factors. Recall that the smaller the
average distance, the more similarly-behaving a host to other hosts in the cluster and
the more likely it is part of a botnet. To reect this concept, we selected a decreasing
function f(Dn) = 1  Dn2 . Since at the beginning we cannot completely trust the host-
level information, we assign w1 to 0.1 and w2 to 0.9, making our detection rely more
on the network-level analysis, which is especially important when a host analyzer is
compromised. Every time the network feature consistency check passes, w1 increases
by 0.05 and w2 decreases by 0.05 until they reach 0.5. The nal detection Scoren is
a value in [0,1].
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Table 3.3: Botnet traces
Trace Duration Number of Bots
IRC-rbot 24h 4
IRC-spybot 32m 4
HTTP-BobaxA 4h 4
HTTP-BobaxB 20h 4
Storm 48h 4
Waledac 24h 4
3.4 Evaluation
3.4.1 Data Collection
We have evaluated the performance of our framework in detecting 3 types of
botnets with real-world traces|IRC-based, HTTP-based, and hybrid-P2P. We set
up VMWare virtual machines running Windows XP, connected via a virtual network
to monitor and collect traces. While running these botnets, we also ran a variety of
benign applications at the same time to make these machines behave similarly to real
compromised hosts. Both the benign and malicious behaviors at the Registry, le
system, and network stack were captured. Table 3.3 shows the details of these botnet
traces, each containing 4 bot instances. The modied source code of IRC-rbot and
IRC-spybot were used in the virtual network to generate their respective traces. We
obtained the binaries of HTTP-based BobaxA and BobaxB, and hybrid-P2P-based
Storm and Waledac from public web sites. The IRC- and HTTP-based botnets'
network-level traces were captured within a controlled environment and transformed
from packet data to ow data in our experiment. Since Storm and Waledac botnets
were still active in the wild at the time when we collected data, we carefully congured
the rewall setting and connected virtual machines to the external network so that
the bots actually joined the real Storm and Waledac botnets, and our campus router
captured all of the bots' trac.
We also collected 5-day NetFlow data from a campus network core router which
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covered the ows generated by Storm and Waledac instances and all other hosts in
the network. Our campus network administrator conrmed that all hosts in the 5-day
ow data except for those running Storm and Waledac were benign, meaning that
there was no botnet trac present in other hosts during that period. Thus, it is valid
to assume that these hosts are benign at both host- and network-level (other types
of malware might run on these hosts but they are not our detection targets). The
5-day data consist of three sets: (1) 2-day data containing 48-hour Storm traces; (2)
1-day data including Waledac; and (3) other 2-day data. We divided the third data
into two subsets, 1-day each. Note that overlaying malicious trac on clean trac
for evaluation has been commonly used in malware detection literature [44, 45, 96].
Although our botnet traces already contained benign trac, the amount of such trac
was limited and we wanted to add more to make it more realistic. Thus, we overlaid
the botnet network traces except Storm and Waledac, one at a time, on data set (3),
two traces on the rst day, and two on the second day. For example, the IRC-rbot
included 4 bot instances, and we randomly selected 4 hosts from the clean 1-day
trac and replaced the bots' IPs with the selected IPs. We treated Storm traces in
the same way and intentionally overlaid the 1-day Waledac trac on HTTP-intensive
benign hosts, the purpose of which will be described later. In addition, hosts running
P2P clients are important for the evaluation of our detection framework as one may
wonder if they will be misclassied as bots. Since NetFlow data could not reliably
identify which hosts had P2P activities, we ran P2P applications such as eMule and
BitTorrent on hosts under our control and collected their host- and network-level
traces. We obtained 4 sets of hour-long traces from hosts running eMule and 3 sets
from those running BitTorrent. While conducting P2P activities, these hosts also ran
other regular network-relevant applications, such as web-browsing, ssh and email-
checking. In what follows, we will show the overhead of the system, the detection
accuracy, and the benet of combining both host- and network-level information.
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Figure 3.2: The change of detection scores for two benign hosts
3.4.2 Overhead
One may want to know the overhead incurred by the three components of our
framework. To measure the overhead of the host analyzer, we used a common Win-
dows benchmark PassMark Software, PerformanceTest [14]. Our host analyzer was
implemented on a machine with AMD Athlon 64 3200+ Processor 2.0GHz, 1GB of
memory, 80GB of disk, and Windows XP operating system. We ran the benchmark
program for CPU, memory and disk, respectively, 5 rounds each. The average over-
head for CPU is 3.1%, memory 3.5% and disk 4.7%. The in-host suspicion-level
generator can determine one host's suspicion level in about 10 s given the behav-
ior vector. Since the SVM is pre-trained (i.e., the support vectors are pre-loaded),
the training process will not incur any runtime overhead to the host. Our network
analyzer and correlation engine were implemented in Linux kernel 2.6.18 on an HP
ServerBlade with 2 Dual-Core AMD Opteron (tm) Processors 2.2 GHz, 4 GB of
RAM, and 260 GB of disk space. The network analyzer can parse 1-hour ow data
and cluster similarly-behaving hosts within 2 minutes on average. To assign the nal
suspicion score and produce a detection result, the correlation engine spends 1 second
per host on average.
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Figure 3.3: Cluster dendrograms with AU/BP values (%) (Left graph: clustering of
bots and benign hosts; Right graph: clustering of benign hosts)
3.4.3 Detection Results
We now report the detection results on 6 botnets. The performance of our de-
tection framework was measured by false-alarm rates, i.e., false-positive (FP) and
false-negative (FN) rates. A false-positive is dened as a benign host mistakenly
classied as a bot-infected, and a false-negative means that an actual bot-infected
host fails to be detected. Recall that the detection score is in the interval [0,1]. The
detection threshold was set to 0.5 in our evaluation to strike a balance between FP
and FN rates, and this parameter is congurable. There is always a tradeo between
FP and FN rates. A lower threshold can be set if FNs are a concern, while a higher
threshold is required if FPs are less desirable.
Table 3.4 shows our evaluation results where the average number of FP or FN
hosts is calculated during the entire period of evaluation. The average FP or FN
rate is the number of FP hosts divided by the total number of benign hosts (around
2,000), or the number of FN hosts divided by the total number of bot-infected hosts.
Our framework was able to identify almost all bot-infected hosts. There was only one
bot undetected, generating a false-negative.
Our framework also performs well in terms of false-positives. The highest false-
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Table 3.4: False alarm rates
Trace Avg FP Avg FP Avg FN Avg FN Duration
hosts Hosts
IRC-rbot 3.208 0.0016 0.125 0.0313 24h
IRC-spybot 2.833 0.0014 0 0 24h
HTTP-BobaxA 1.000 0.0005 0 0 24h
HTTP-BobaxB 1.083 0.0005 0 0 24h
Storm 2.563 0.0013 0 0 48h
Waledac 0.9167 0.0005 0 0 24h
positive rate was no greater than 0.16%. It turned out that almost all false-positive
hosts appeared during the rst few hours of the traces due to the values of \untuned"
weight factors w1 and w2. As mentioned before, we set w1 (the weight of suspicion
level) to 0.1 and w2 (the weight of clustering quality) to 0.9 at the beginning to reect
lack of condence in the host-level information. During the rst few hours our frame-
work relied more on the network-level analysis, resulting in detection inaccuracy when
a group of benign hosts demonstrated similar network behaviors among themselves
(e.g. they ran the same network applications) or behaved similarly to bot-infected
hosts. As the host-level information was veried to be trustable, w1 increased and w2
decreased so that host-level information gradually had a higher weight and was able
to correct the detection results. Figure 3.2 shows the change of the detection scores
on two benign hosts which have similar network trac patterns and form a cluster
by themselves. At the beginning, both of them have greater than 0.5 detection scores
due to the high weight assigned to the clustering quality parameter, leading to false-
positives. As time goes by, the suspicion-level parameter receives a more balanced
weight. Since their suspicion levels are always low (0 to 0.1), their nal detection
scores decrease below the 0.5 threshold and no longer incur false-positives. Network-
and host-level information indeed complement each other, and hence combining them
while making a detection decision is the key to reducing false alarm rates.
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3.4.4 Evaluation with Network Analyzer
Using the network analyzer that performs ow analysis and clustering, we found
some interesting results. The trigger-action association done by the ow analyzer can
signicantly narrow the number of hosts for clustering because benign hosts rarely
visit the same IP with the same protocol after trac ltering, while bot-infected hosts
connect to the same group of C&C servers or peers. Even if benign hosts cannot
be ltered out by trigger-action association, they are likely to be discarded by the
clustering module because their ow patterns are usually dierent among themselves
and dierent from bot-infected hosts. This fact makes the clustering module eective
in reducing the number of benign hosts appearing in the nal clusters.
Figure 3.3 shows the hierarchical clustering dendrogram of scenarios in which a
few benign hosts were ruled out not by the trigger-action association but by the
clustering module. The graph on the left is the scenario when bot-infected and
benign hosts happened to visit the same destination and their ow feature vectors
were sent to the clustering module for grouping. There are 6 hosts to be clustered,
numbered from 1 to 6. 1 to 4 are bot-infected hosts, and 5 to 6 are benign hosts.
Recall that we use hierarchical clustering with AU p-values indicating how strong
the clustering is supported by data. Normally, clusters with p-values greater than
95% are considered reasonable clusters. The AU p-values and reasonable clusters are
highlighted by rectangles in the gure. In the left graph, 4 bot-infected hosts are
clustered together with 100% AU values, meaning that their ow feature vectors are
quite similar. The two benign hosts in the graph cannot form a cluster with them
because of the dissimilarity in ow patterns between the benign and bot-infected
hosts. The graph on the right represents the scenario when a few benign hosts visited
the same destination. 4 hosts, numbered from 1 to 4, are all benign. The 4 benign
hosts cannot make any cluster (low AU p-values), since their ow feature vectors
dier signicantly.
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We also collected additional data from several benign hosts running P2P applica-
tions to see if false-positives would occur. Four hosts each ran an eMule client, and
three other hosts each ran a BitTorrent client named utorrent. Besides P2P le shar-
ing, these hosts also made other network accesses during the period of trace collection.
This is realistic because normally a P2P user does multi-tasking during le-sharing,
rather than solely waiting for the le-sharing to complete. We used the network an-
alyzer to perform ow analysis and clustering on these P2P data sets. It turned out
that the four eMule hosts did visit the same IPs (servers) so that they were not ruled
out by the trigger-action association and needed to be clustered. The same thing
happened to the three utorrent clients. However, during the clustering, those P2P
hosts could not make any cluster. We found that the AU p-values generated for the
four eMule hosts were no greater than 85% and for the three utorrent ones no greater
than 90%, both of which were below the 95% clustering threshold. That is, these
benign hosts did not behave similarly at the network level even though they ran the
same P2P client. One reason for this is that P2P le-sharing is a user-specic activity.
Users have dierent interests and download or upload dierent les so that the ow
features, such as total bytes, number of packets and number of TCP or UDP ows
are hardly similar. The other reason is that network activities other than P2P also
add some dissimilarity to the ow patterns among hosts running P2P applications.
Although in our experiment, P2P hosts were ruled out by the clustering module, we
still inspected their host-level behaviors to make sure that even if the network ana-
lyzer failed to distinguish them, the host analyzer could tell they were benign. The
results were in line with our expectation: the suspicion-levels for these hosts were
always much less than 0.5, because there was little malicious behavior demonstrated
at the host level. In this scenario, since the correlation engine considers both types of
information, it will generate correct detection results with the help of suspicion-levels
even if the network analyzer cannot rule them out.
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In summary, our network analyzer|the ow analyzer along with the clustering
module|is eective in forming suspicious clusters, but it may fail in some situations
in which the host analyzer needs to assist. We present such a case study next.
3.4.5 Evaluation with Host Analyzer: A Case Study of Waledac
Waledac worm spreads as an attachment to a spam email or through a link to
a malicious website. It came into the wild at the end of 2008 and has not yet been
completely taken down (as of March 2010). The Waledac botnet uses the HTTP
protocol for C&C trac forwarding and the botmasters are well hidden behind a
P2P network [40]. We downloaded samples by following Waledac spam's links to its
malicious domains in Feb 2009.
In our evaluation, we intentionally overlaid Waledac's network traces on benign
hosts with heavy HTTP trac. We did this because Waledac appeared stealthy in its
network activities, and we wanted to evaluate how well our framework can perform
in the situations where the network analyzer cannot distinguish between benign and
bot-infected hosts. We observed that these Waledac instances did not send any spam
email in the 24-hour period. The only activity was several HTTP sessions every hour
for C&C such as transferring locally-collected information. This type of malicious
trac is easy to blend into benign HTTP ows but hard to isolate.
Over a few time windows, our network analyzer mistakenly clustered one benign
host into the same group as 4 Waledac bots. One reason lies in the way we mixed
benign and bot's trac for bot-infected hosts (we did this intentionally). It turned out
that the HTTP-intensive benign host and the 4 bot-infected hosts had visited the same
destination IP using the HTTP protocol. As shown before, only visiting the same IP
is not enough for forming a cluster. To be grouped into the same cluster, the hosts
should have similar trac patterns. For most bot-infected hosts, although their ows
are mixed with benign ows, their malicious ow patterns may still be conspicuous
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because of their distinct and aggressive spam sending and scanning activities. In other
words, their network-level behaviors can be distinguished from those of benign hosts
during the clustering. However, in the Waledac's case, the stealthy C&C trac was
hidden and diluted into the benign HTTP trac, and the clustering module failed
to dierentiate bot-infected hosts' network activities from those of the benign hosts,
which is the other reason for the incorrect clustering. Nevertheless, our framework
still correctly generated the detection results for Waledac bot instances, thanks to
the information obtained by the host analyzer. As the Waledac exhibited malicious
behavior at the host level, each bot-infected host's suspicion level was 0.88 on average.
On the other hand, the benign host's suspicion level was close to 0. The nal detection
Scoren for bot-infected hosts was as high as 0.85, while that for benign hosts was
0.40. Without the host analyzer, benign hosts are likely to be misclassied as bot-
infected ones in the presence of bots that are stealthy at the network level. In other
words, relying solely on the network-level analysis cannot create a complete picture:
the inspection of in-host behavior by the host analyzer is critical in reducing false-
positives.
3.5 Discussions
One limitation of our approach is its scalability since the approach requires runtime
host-level analyzers. Our design is intended for use in edge networks such as enterprise
networks where a security framework can be enforced easily on all hosts. In large-scale
networks, if host analyzers cannot be installed on every host, we may use available
host analyzers to infer the suspicion levels at those without the analyzers if they form
the same suspicious cluster by network-level analysis.
Since our network analyzer looks for trigger-action patterns among hosts, bots may
delay their coordinated actions by waiting for random period of time. To counter this
evasion, we may lengthen our time window of analysis or randomly select a time
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window that cannot be gured out by attackers. As the goal of a botnet is to perform
malicious actions, if each bot does not act maliciously for a very long time, it will be
ineective, causing few problems. Bots may also attempt to randomize their trac
patterns such as injecting random number of packets in each ow or they can mimic
ow patterns of benign hosts. However, these techniques may not help bots much to
evade our detection because our framework also considers host-level behavior while
making detection decisions.
Since our framework is deployed in a monitored network, hosts within the network
are geographically close to one another. It is natural for bots to connect to, or
bootstrap from, the same set of nearby IPs to receive commands and take actions in
a coordinated manner. To intentionally evade our network analyzer, bots may use
dierent C&C servers or contact a dierent set of IPs. If there are a large number of
bots in our network, our approach may group them into several suspicious clusters.
However, if there is only one or a few bots (without contacting the same set of IPs),
our detection framework should obtain information from the host analyzers more
frequently. If a host's suspicion level is high enough, the detection result can be
generated even without any suspicious cluster.
Another possible evasion of our framework is to compromise the host analyzers
and send falsied information to the correlation engine. This can happen only if the
bot sits below our host monitoring level and is able to modify or subvert the system-
wide information the in-host monitor receives. Our current solution is to gather a few
network statistics from the host to compare against those observed by the network
analyzer. A bot may keep the network statistics intact and modify the suspicion-level
information only to mislead the correlation engine. Even if this happens, there is
still a high possibility of capturing the bot, because the weight factor assigned to the
host-level information by the correlation engine is much lower than the weight factor
assigned to the network-level information (i.e., clustering quality) at the beginning.
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It means that with a high weight factor on network information, as long as the
compromised host exhibits correlated malicious network-level activities and forms a
suspicious cluster with other hosts, it will be detected with high probability despite
the falsied suspicion-level from the host analyzer. To further counter this attack, we
may use secure hardware or secure VMM to safeguard the OS as well as our monitors
in each host.
While it is likely that our framework could be evaded, the evaluation results
demonstrated that our system performed well in detecting state-of-the-art botnets
with minimal impact on benign hosts. Therefore, our system raises the bar against
botnets.
3.6 Conclusion
Considering the coordination of bots within a botnet and each bot's malicious
behavior at the host level, we proposed a C&C protocol-independent botnet detection
framework that combines both host- and network-level information. Our evaluation
based on real-world data has shown the following results. The network analyzer is
eective in forming suspicious clusters of aggressive bots but fails to separate benign
hosts from bot-infected hosts if the latter are stealthy at the network level. When
the stealthy bots are present, it is the host analyzer that provides correct detection
results by generating distinguishing suspicion levels. By using combined host- and
network-level information, our framework is able to detect dierent types of botnets
with low false-positive and false-negative rates.
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CHAPTER IV
Large-Scale Botnet Detection at the Internet
Infrastructure
4.1 Introduction
A botnet consists of a group of coordinated bots that can mount attacks such as
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), spamming, phishing and identity theft. Botnets
are posing a serious security threat to the Internet users; they can bring down the
entire system and disrupt Internet services. In a botnet, a Command and Control
(C&C) channel, in which a botmaster disseminates commands to, and get response
from bots, is a key element. Attackers have recently devised a decentralized C&C
infrastructure exploiting the P2P protocol. A few noteworthy P2P botnets in recent
years include Storm [22], Waledac [25] and Concker [6]. Their P2P implementations
are either based on an existing protocol (Storm utilized Kademila [61]) or completely
customized.
The decentralized nature of P2P botnets inevitably challenges detection attempts.
Approaches targeting centralized C&C structures [29, 43, 45, 56] become ineective
under the new structure in which a botmaster can join, issue commands and leave
at any time at any place. Generic detection approaches [44, 98] relying on behavior
monitoring and trac correlation analysis are mostly applicable at a small scale such
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as in edge networks and do not scale well because they require analyzing vast amounts
of ne-grained information. In addition, if there is only a small number of bots in
an edge network, detection based on bots' coordination may fail due to the limited
number of instances in view. Given the fact that current botnets' sizes are in the
order of hundreds of thousands, an eective and ecient large-scale detection needs
to function at a high level without requiring ne-grained information that can only be
obtained locally. As a P2P botnet has a structured overlay and connectivity patterns
dierent from other applications from a graph analysis perspective, naturally, we
consider detection at the Internet infrastructure level by assessing the impact imposed
by a P2P botnet at various network components and measuring the eectiveness of
detection at such places.
4.1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we evaluate the feasibility of detecting large-scale P2P botnets
with dierent network components at the Internet infrastructure level. We construct
three types of P2P-botnet overlays, map them to the corresponding AS (Autonomous
System)-level underlays by inferring each overlay connection's AS-path, and accord-
ingly determine the PoP (Point of Presence) path and geographical router rendezvous
(co-located routers in the infrastructure) each connection goes through. We then
take a close look at each individual AS, PoP and router rendezvous based on graph
analysis. In particular, we calculate a few P2P trac classication metrics to see
whether the portion of botnet connections observed by a single network component
can be identied as P2P trac. We would like to answer the following three questions
through our analysis: (1) which network component is the best place for detection?
(2) which P2P overlay structure can help hide the botnet trac well? (3) what are
the limitations of detection at the infrastructure level? Our main contribution lies in
the thorough analysis of detection potential at the three infrastructure-level network
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components for three dierent P2P overlay topologies.
Our analysis has led to three key observations. First, a small number of ASes can
observe almost all overlay connections, but the AS-level detection is less practical.
PoPs can capture a large fraction of connections but the number of monitoring points
is limited. Router rendezvous strike a balance between detection capability and fea-
sibility. Second, a botnet has to make a tradeo between resilience/eciency and the
ability to evade detection. Third, the infrastructure-level detection is not a panacea
for all large-scale botnets: it needs to be integrated with detection schemes in edge
networks to complete a detection picture.
4.1.2 Organization
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes related
work. Section 4.3 details our methodology. Section 4.4 presents analysis results.
Section 4.5 discusses a few challenges associated with our approach. The chapter
concludes with Section 5.6.
4.2 Related Work
Considering the fact that P2P botnets have structured overlay topologies, our
approach takes a global view, exploiting structural properties derived from graph
analysis and is thus not limited by the availability of ne-grained information. In
this regard, our work is closely related to graph-based trac classication and anal-
ysis. Iliofotou et al. [53] proposed the use of Trac Dispersion Graphs (TDGs) to
monitor, analyze, and visualize network trac. TDGs focus on network-wide inter-
actions among hosts and show that graph features, such as the average degree and
directionality, can be utilized to distinguish dierent applications. Using TDGs, they
further classied P2P trac at the Internet backbone [52]. Their scheme lters out
known trac, forms trac clusters roughly based on applications, and nally, uses
71
some graph metrics to identify whether a cluster belongs to a P2P application. In our
analysis, we adopt some of their metrics to determine whether the portion of trac
observed by a network component is P2P. BotGrep [65] analyzes structured graph
to locate bots by extracting P2P subgraphs from a communication graph containing
background trac. This approach assumes the visibility of the entire botnet commu-
nication graph, whereas our detection is at a single network component where only a
fraction of botnet communication can be seen.
We are aware of two published results on AS-level underlays mapped from P2P
overlays. Rasti et al. [73] examined the global impact of the load imposed by a P2P
overlay on the AS-level underlay. They use Gnutella network snapshots to analyze
diversity and load on individual AS-paths, churn among the top transit ASes and
propagation of trac within the AS-level hierarchy. Their focus was on the eect
of overlay on the underlay, while our work is concerned with whether the eect can
be utilized for detection. Jelasity et al. [54] constructed a modied Chord [82]
topology and showed that the visibility of P2P botnet trac at any single AS is
limited and not sucient for detection. Our method diers from theirs in the following
aspects. First, we consider bots' geographical distribution in the overlay topology
while they assume that the number of overlay nodes in each AS is proportional to
the size of the AS. Second, our AS-level paths are not derived from the shortest-path
algorithm they used, but a more realistic scheme. Third, we simulate three P2P
overlay topologies and observe the trac not only at the AS-level but also at PoPs
and router rendezvous, providing a more thorough analysis.
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Figure 4.1: Overview
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Overview
We would like to achieve the following two goals. First, from a defender's perspec-
tive, we would like to see how much of the botnet connections can be observed at a
single network component and whether the respective communication graph has P2P
properties. Second, from an attacker's perspective, we want to study which P2P over-
lay topology is stealthy enough so that at a single network component the graph-level
information is insucient for detection. Our methodology consists of four main steps
as shown in Figure 4.1. In the rst step, we construct a P2P overlay topology based
on simulation and learn which end-device talks to which, i.e., the overlay connections.
In the second step, to map the overlay to the AS-level underlay, we associate a con-
nection's two end-devices' IP addresses with the corresponding ASes and calculate
the AS-level path between the two ASes. Given the AS paths, we then determine
PoP-level paths and geographical router rendezvous paths. Knowing the paths of all
connections, in the third step, we break down the connections on per-AS, per-PoP,
and per-router-rendezvous bases. We are especially interested in the top ASes, PoPs
and router rendezvous ranked by the number of connections going through. In the
last step, we inspect those top network components individually. As in [54, 73], we
do not consider background trac but focus only on the trac coming from the P2P
overlay, which is the best scenario. It implies that if the P2P trac cannot be iden-
tied under this situation, it will denitely not be captured when background trac
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Table 4.1: Data sources used in our Internet infrastructure and end-device model
Model component Data sources
Backbone topology Skitter dataset: http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/skitter/
Alias clustering data from the iPlane project:
http://iplane.cs.washington.edu/data/alias_lists.txt
IP geolocation dataset: http://www.ip2location.com/
Internet Point of Presence Telegeography co-location database: http://www.telegeography.com/
Internet end-devices US census data: census-block population in each 250250m2 grid
in the US for a 24-hour duration [62]
Internet access routers Dial-up service aggregators per each zip code:
http://www.findanisp.com
Broadband ISP market share:
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/081108release.html
DSL central oce locations:
the LERG (Local Exchange Routing Guide) dataset from Telcordia
Cable company service locations: Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) dataset
Internet routing BGP routing information from the University of Oregon
Route Views Project: http://www.routeviews.org/
AS prex sets: http://www.fixedorbit.com/
AS-level path inference: Qiu and Gao's algorithm [71]
is present. We analyze several graph properties of the communication patterns at
each top network component and determine whether it has the characteristics of P2P
trac.
4.3.2 Internet Infrastructure and End-Device Modeling
Before detailing the four main steps, we would like to briey describe the Inter-
net infrastructure and end-device modeling, which lays a basis for our methodology.
We use multiple real-world datasets to construct a realistic model of the US Internet
infrastructure. Table 4.1 lists all data sources in the model construction. In total,
73,884,296 residential computers are generated in the entire US (except Hawaii and
Alaska). The distribution of Internet access routers including dial-up, DSL and Cable
is based on the market share of top US broadband companies and dial-up service ag-
gregators, and how these access routers connect to the backbone topology at Internet
PoP locations is derived from AS peering relationships. We refer interested readers
to [95] for details of this modeling.
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4.3.3 Overlay Topology Construction
In recent years, P2P overlays have become popular in botnet construction due to
their decentralized nature. Many existing P2P overlays can be utilized to facilitate
botnets' C&C. We construct three types of P2P overlays: a widely-used Kademlia
[61], a modied Chord [82] and a simple ring structure. We will later compare the
structural properties of these three overlay topologies at each network component,
the results of which will be presented in Section 4.4. Next, we will briey introduce
each P2P overlay followed by the way we construct the topology.
4.3.3.1 Kademlia
Kademlia is a Distributed-Hash-Table (DHT)-based P2P overlay protocol. Under
this protocol, there is no central server and resource locations are stored throughout
the network. Nodes are identied by node IDs and data items are identied by keys
generated from a hash function; node IDs and keys are of the same length. Data items
are stored in nodes whose IDs are close to data items' keys. The distance between
two IDs, X and Y , is calculated by bitwise exclusive or (XOR) operation: X  Y .
To search a data item, a node queries its neighbors for nodes whose IDs are close to
this data item's key. After getting responses from its neighbors, the node continues
to query those nodes that are closer to the key. This iterative process repeats until
no closer nodes can be found. The benet of Kademlia is its resilience to disruptions.
Even if a few nodes are shut down or removed, the network will still be able to
function. Kad network is an implementation of Kademlia. A few major P2P le
sharing networks adopt the Kad implementation, such as Overnet and eMule. The
Storm botnet was built upon Overnet.
An ideal way to construct the botnet overlay topology is to collect trac traces
from a real network, such as the Storm botnet. Since the Storm botnet is decentral-
ized (i.e., there are no central venues where all communications can be observed),
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traces captured from the Storm botnet fall into two categories each of which has its
drawbacks. In the rst category, the trac data were collected from a single or a
few vantage points. They can only provide partial views of the entire botnet. In
the second category, snapshots of the network were taken by network crawlers. The
snapshots contain information, such as which IPs are alive or dead but cannot tell
which IP connects to which IP. To characterize the eectiveness of detection at the
underlay, a full picture capturing the entire network's connections is indispensable,
so we have to construct a Kad network by simulation.
We use a high-delity botnet simulator BotSim [46] which integrates a popular
P2P client named aMule [1], an implementation of Kad. Considering the fact that
simulating a large-scale botnet (100,000 bots) on a single or a few machines will take a
prohibitively long time, our simulator was run on a distributed platform consisting of
400 machines, each with 2 Pentium III CPUs and 4Gb RAM. The simulator is a com-
ponent of MIITS [91] which is built upon PRIME SSF [15], a distributed simulation
engine utilizing conservative synchronization techniques. To make aMule work seam-
lessly on our simulator, several modications were made to the original aMule code
including intercepting time-related system calls and substituting them for simulated
time function calls, and replacing socket API calls with network functions developed
in MIITS. The rest of the code remains intact.
In a botnet, a majority of bots are compromised residential computers and not
necessarily geographically close, and hence we have to take locations into account.
Constrained by data availability, all bots in our simulation are in the US and their
locations follow the geographical distribution of 73 million residential computers by
state. The simulation of 100,000 bots executes for three days in simulation time. The
output les log timestamps and connections in the network. We discarded the rst
day in which bots bootstrap and the entire botnet stabilizes, and kept the second and
the third day for analysis. With log les keeping track of which node talks to which
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other node and each node's state information, we need to obtain the IP address of
each end-device to completely construct the overlay topology. For this, we randomly
chose an end-device address from the state a bot resides in. This way, we created two
Kad overlay topologies with 100,000 nodes, one day each.
4.3.3.2 Modied Chord
Chord is a DHT-based P2P protocol under which nodes form a ring structure.
Each node has a predecessor and a successor and a few long range links. For example,
there are a total of N nodes in the ring. Node i connects to nodes (i 1) mod N and
(i+1) mod N . It also connects to nodes (i+2k) mod N for k = 1; 2; : : : ; log2N   1
to form long-range links. In [54], modications to Chord are proposed so that it
is dicult to detect the botnet through graph analysis at any single AS. The main
modication is creating clusters in the ring each of which has log2N consecutive
nodes. This way, nodes in the same cluster can share the same set of long-range links
for routing. This topology is of interest to us because we want to see whether using
a more realistic AS-path calculation algorithm can make a dierence in detection
and whether this topology can successfully hide itself at PoPs and router rendezvous
as well. Since this modied Chord's topology is relatively simple, we constructed
its overlay with 100,000 nodes directly based on its protocol without simulation.
Following the same practice as in Kademlia, each end-device address is a random
draw from the state a bot belongs to.
4.3.3.3 Simple Ring
We also consider the simplest case: each node has only two neighbors|a prede-
cessor and a successor|to construct a ring structure. Presumably, this structure is
stealthier and harder to detect than the modied Chord due to lack lack of connec-
tivity at the overlay. We will verify this presumption in later analysis. Similar to
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the modied chord, this overlay has 100,000 nodes constructed directly and the bots'
locations follow the same geographical distribution.
4.3.4 Overlay to Underlay Mapping
4.3.4.1 AS-Path
Given all overlay connections, the next step is to map each connection to an AS-
level path. Note that each end-device IP address is associated with an AS number
and determining an AS-path of a connection is actually to determine the AS-path
between two ASes. We use the AS-path inference algorithm in [71] for inter-domain
routing. The key idea is to infer AS paths from existing BGP routing tables.
4.3.4.2 PoP-Path
A PoP is an access point to the Internet. It is a physical location owned by an
ISP or located at Internet exchange points and co-location centers. The computa-
tion of a PoP-level path is based on the respective AS-level path. Given a pair of
source and destination end-device IPs, the algorithm rst determines the AS-level
path AS1AS2 : : : ASn, then iteratively nds the shortest IP-level path between PoPs
connecting every neighboring pair of ASes and nally maps the IP-level path to the
PoP-level path. We refer interested readers to [95] for details of this algorithm.
4.3.4.3 Router Rendezvous Path
Given an IP-level path of a connection, the geographical router rendezvous along
this particular path can be determined directly.
4.3.5 Trac Breakdown
Since our work focuses on structural properties of trac graph at a single network
component (AS, PoP or router rendezvous), not the entire botnet overlay per se, we
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need to break the trac down on a per AS, per PoP and per router rendezvous basis.
This breakdown process is straightforward. We then rank the three types of network
components by the number of connections going through, and take a close look at the
graph properties observed at each of the top 10 ASes, PoPs, and router rendezvous,
respectively, in our analysis.
4.3.6 Graph Analysis
After breaking down the trac, we know all connections that traverse a particular
AS, PoP and router rendezvous. We can then generate directed graphs in which bots
are represented by vertices and connections among them are represented by edges.
For simplicity, all edges carry the same weight. Graph metrics to determine whether
the trac is P2P are proposed in [52] and adopted to analyze the modied chord in
[54]. In our analysis, we inspect the same set of features as in [54] for consistency.
The features used to characterize P2P trac include the number of weakly-connected
components, size of the largest weakly-connected component, average node degree
and InO (In Out) ratio. We introduce each of them as follows.
Number of Weakly-Connected Components: A weakly-connected compo-
nent is a maximal subgraph of a directed graph such that in the subgraph replacing
all of its directed edges with undirected edges produces a connected undirected graph.
For eective detection, we expect a small number of weakly-connected components.
As one can imagine, a large number of connected components usually means small-size
components that are less likely to exhibit typical P2P patterns.
Size of the Largest Weakly-Connected Component: This metric is mean-
ingful to us because as pointed in [53] the graph formed by a P2P network tends to
be densely connected and have a large connected component including the majority
of participating nodes.
Average Node Degree: This metric counts both the incoming and outgoing
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edges of a node, i.e., ignoring the directionality. A graph with a high average degree
tends to be tightly-connected and P2P networks normally have high average node
degrees.
InO Ratio: The metric calculates the percentage of nodes in the graph that
have both incoming and outgoing edges. This metric is of interest because under
client-server protocols such as HTTP and SMTP, clients usually initiate connections
(outgoing edges) whereas servers normally accept connections (incoming edges). But
nodes in P2P networks usually serve as both clients and servers so that P2P's InO is
distinctively higher than others.
4.4 Analysis Results
This section presents our analysis results. Recall that we construct three dierent
P2P overlay topologies, namely, Kad, the modied Chord and the simple ring, and
examine their trac graphs, respectively, at three types of network components.
As introduced in Section 4.3.6, the graph features characterizing P2P patterns are
the number of weakly-connected components, size of the largest weakly-connected
component, average node degree and InO ratio. We conduct graph analysis rst at
the AS-level, then the PoP-level and nally, the router-rendezvous-level, and show
the graph features at the top 10 places of each level.
4.4.1 AS-Level Analysis
We rst take a look at the AS-level graphs of three dierent topologies. Table
4.2 shows the Kad graph properties for day1 and day2, respectively, at top 10 ASes,
ranked by the number of unique connections going through. We map the AS numbers
to ISPs using the AS-name lookup list [3]. It turns out that from day1 to day2 the
top 10 order changes slightly but the 10 AS numbers remain the same. As expected,
these top ASes belong to large ISPs such as AT&T and Verizon. Note that the
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trac percentage at a single AS is calculated by the number of unique connections
observed at that particular AS divided by the total number of unique connections
in the entire overlay topology. Since one connection usually can be seen at more
than on AS (this is why the third column of the table adds up to more than 100%),
we count each connection only once while calculating the number of connections
observed at multiple ASes altogether. Following such calculations, in both days, top
10 ASes aggregated together can observe 98.95%|almost all of the Kad overlay's
unique connections. In particular, the top 1 AS (3356/Level3) alone can see two
thirds of the overlay trac with all nodes (100000) in the picture in both days. Even
for ASes carrying fewer connections, they have at least 99912 nodes' connections
traverse through. Most importantly, at each top AS, all nodes are weakly-connected
with each other, forming one giant weakly-connected component. This property can
facilitate detection because one single weakly-connected graph containing a majority
of connections is more likely to demonstrate P2P characteristics and easier to get
caught than a disconnected graph with many connected components of small sizes.
As suggested in [52], two metrics can characterize P2P trac. One is a high average
degree (larger than 2.8), and the other is a high InO ratio (large than 1%). In both
days, at all top ASes, the average degrees and InO values are high enough for P2P
classication: the lowest value of average degree is 56.8 and that of InO is 87.75%.
Thus, as we can see, all top AS venues have high visibility of Kad's overlay which
demonstrates typical P2P patterns, sucient for detection.
Table 4.3 presents graph features of the modied Chord at top 10 ASes. Compared
to Kad, top 10 AS numbers remain the same but their ranks change a bit. They in
total observe 99.61%, an enormous fraction of overlay connections and the top 1 AS
is still 3356 witnessing 64.25% of all connections. Note that the AS observing the
most can see 80620 while the one observing the least can only see 13900 nodes. As
for the number of connected components, to the contrary of Kad, each AS's graph
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Table 4.2: Kad AS-level
Kad Day1 # of
ISP AS Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree Conn Comp InO
Level3 3356 65.25% 100000 38192566 763.9 1 99.02%
AT&T 7018 35.33% 100000 20679083 413.6 1 99.02%
XO 2828 23.39% 100000 13691127 273.8 1 99.02%
Sprint 1239 8.32% 99983 4872140 97.5 1 99.01%
Verizon 19262 8.30% 100000 4859686 97.2 1 100.00%
Qwest 209 8.28% 100000 4848724 97.0 1 99.02%
NTT 2914 7.78% 99993 4556302 91.1 1 99.02%
BellSouth 6389 7.78% 100000 4554972 91.1 1 99.01%
AT&T 7132 6.78% 99995 3965587 79.3 1 100.00%
UUNET 701 5.38% 99937 3148400 63.0 1 88.13%
Kad Day2
Level3 3356 66.69% 100000 39628509 792.6 1 99.02%
AT&T 7018 34.96% 100000 20772860 415.5 1 99.02%
XO 2828 24.18% 100000 14367036 287.3 1 99.02%
Qwest 209 8.35% 100000 4959076 99.2 1 99.02%
Sprint 1239 7.76% 99969 4611389 92.3 1 99.01%
BellSouth 6389 7.59% 100000 4509341 90.2 1 99.01%
Verizon 19262 7.23% 100000 4294952 85.9 1 100.00%
NTT 2914 7.06% 99988 4196433 83.9 1 99.02%
AT&T 7132 6.33% 99990 3761651 75.2 1 100.00%
UUNET 701 4.78% 99912 2839591 56.8 1 87.75%
Table 4.3: Modied Chord AS-level
# of
ISP AS Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree Conn Comp InO
Level3 3356 64.25% 80620 112431 2.8 9639 66.22%
AT&T 7018 38.09% 54272 66650 2.5 10534 51.62%
XO 2828 22.73% 36234 39784 2.2 7470 47.03%
Verizon 19262 9.43% 17365 16494 1.9 3726 37.01%
NTT 2914 8.09% 15339 14151 1.8 3384 34.45%
Sprint 1239 7.64% 14908 13366 1.8 3602 31.16%
Qwest 209 7.20% 14642 12594 1.7 3757 27.99%
AT&T 7132 7.13% 13849 12482 1.8 2956 33.29%
BellSouth 6389 6.82% 13486 11934 1.8 3080 30.47%
UUNET 701 6.27% 13900 10978 1.6 4305 16.41%
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Table 4.4: Simple ring AS-level
# of
ISP AS Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree Conn Comp InO
Level3 3356 64.76% 79327 64755 1.6 14522 63.31%
AT&T 7018 37.51% 51316 37511 1.5 13805 46.20%
XO 2828 22.81% 32148 22805 1.4 9343 41.88%
Verizon 19262 9.30% 13632 9297 1.3 4335 36.40%
NTT 2914 8.05% 11867 8046 1.3 3821 35.60%
Sprint 1239 7.53% 11604 7532 1.3 4072 29.82%
Qwest 209 7.36% 11494 7362 1.3 4132 28.10%
AT&T 7132 7.07% 10430 7066 1.3 3364 35.49%
BellSouth 6389 6.73% 10193 6728 1.3 3465 32.01%
UUNET 701 6.17% 10831 6166 1.1 4665 13.86%
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is not well connected and has thousands of connected components. Figure 4.2 shows
in log scale the sizes of 10 largest weakly-connected components at top 5 ASes. Top
1 AS 3356's largest component has 36532 nodes but all other components are very
small containing 15 nodes or so. Top 2 AS 7018 has two large components with
8729 and 7506 nodes respectively and other components' sizes drop signicantly. The
component sizes remain stable at other ASes, all in the order of hundreds. Due to the
relatively sparse structure of the modied Chord, unsurprisingly, the average degree
at each AS is low|from 2.8 to 1.6, though the InO values are high|from 66.22% to
16.41%. Taking all metrics into account, AS 3356 is able to detect the P2P overlay
since it can see a large portion of the overlay with typical P2P patterns, if not the
entire one. If we relax the average degree threshold a bit, AS 7018 may also be a good
venue to make detection eorts considering the two large connected components. We
think it is hard for the rest of the ASes to do so due to their relatively fragmented
views. Note that our observations on modied Chord are slightly dierent from
those in [54] which concludes that even at the most central (top) ASes the average
degrees are less than 2 and connected components are mostly of size 2 and 3 with
the maximal containing 29 nodes. This dierence may be attributed to the way of
mapping the overlay to the underlay: they make the number of overlay nodes in
each AS proportional to the size of the AS whereas we consider the geographical
distribution of nodes. In addition, our AS-path inference algorithm is also dierent
from theirs: they assume shortest paths while our inter-domain AS-pathes are derived
from real-world BGP routing tables.
When it comes to the simple ring structure (Table 4.4), the top AS numbers do
not change, and their ranks are the same as those for the modied Chord. 99.62%
of overlay connections traverse through top 10 ASes. Though the top1 AS 3356 can
see 64.76% of the total trac, the number of nodes visible (79327) are more than
the number of edges (64755), resulting in a great number of connected components
84
13
9
27
81
243
729
2187
6561
19683
59049
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S
iz
e
10 Largest Components
Modified Chord PoP-Level
74
7
267
11
128
Figure 4.4: Modied Chord: 10 largest
components at top 5 PoPs
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S
iz
e
10 Largest Components
Simple Ring PoP-Level
74
7
11
128
267
Figure 4.5: Simple ring: 10 largest com-
ponents at top 5 PoPs
(14522) and small component sizes. As seen in Figure 4.3, 3356's largest component
only has 34 nodes. We also verify that a majority of 3356 connected components have
fewer than 10 nodes. The average degrees are all below 2, which is expected because
each node only has a predecessor and a successor so that the average degree of the
entire graph is only 2. Even though the InO values are high enough, detection based
on scattered information at a single AS is dicult.
4.4.2 PoP-Level Analysis
At the PoP level, we also present graph features at each top PoP of three P2P
structures. PoPs are represented by ID numbers and ranked by the number of unique
connections going through as well. In Table 4.5, as we can see, both the top 10 PoP
numbers and their ranks change slightly from day1 to day2. Top 10 PoPs account for
80.88% of overlay connections in day1 and 81.58% in day2, a slightly drop compared
to that observed at top 10 ASes which can see more than 98%. This makes sense
because PoPs, normally as trac exchange points, are not able to see intra-domain
trac taking place within ASes. The top PoP 74 alone is able to observe 53.78% and
54.84% of all connections respectively in each day. Similar to the AS-level, not only
almost all nodes (more than 99967) can be seen at each top PoP, but also they are
weakly connected forming one single component. The average degrees and InO ratios
are well above the P2P classication thresholds.
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Table 4.5: Kad PoP-level
Kad Day1
PoP Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree # of Conn Comp InO
74 53.78% 100000 31479094 629.6 1 100.00%
7 10.29% 100000 6024939 120.5 1 99.94%
435 8.27% 100000 4837622 96.8 1 98.50%
11 8.14% 99998 4763870 95.3 1 99.86%
128 7.77% 99981 4550316 91.0 1 99.52%
282 7.37% 99995 4315967 86.3 1 100.00%
4 7.27% 99977 4257513 85.2 1 99.73%
267 6.72% 99992 3934199 78.7 1 100.00%
291 6.26% 99975 3661420 73.2 1 100.00%
295 6.25% 99997 3658911 73.2 1 99.97%
Kad Day2
74 54.84% 100000 32588327 651.8 1 100.00%
7 10.06% 100000 5976120 119.5 1 99.97%
128 8.22% 99991 4883282 97.7 1 99.66%
11 8.06% 100000 4790115 95.8 1 99.87%
291 7.49% 99997 4450255 89.0 1 100.00%
435 7.41% 100000 4404198 88.1 1 98.60%
267 7.20% 99996 4279914 85.6 1 100.00%
4 7.19% 99967 4271196 85.5 1 99.67%
282 7.07% 99992 4199285 84.0 1 99.99%
239 5.88% 99879 3491615 69.9 1 99.65%
Table 4.6: Modied Chord PoP-level
PoP Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree # of Conn Comp InO
74 54.07% 77488 94629 2.4 16735 48.00%
7 9.27% 19927 16222 1.6 6095 21.91%
267 7.99% 14764 13981 1.9 3092 34.80%
11 7.98% 17225 13957 1.6 5334 18.75%
128 7.46% 17169 13058 1.5 5673 17.39%
4 7.25% 15962 12686 1.6 4834 20.36%
435 6.94% 13649 12151 1.8 3067 32.38%
282 6.81% 13677 11913 1.7 3184 31.41%
291 6.36% 12433 11137 1.8 2683 32.68%
295 5.84% 11877 10228 1.7 2803 29.32%
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Table 4.7: Simple ring PoP-level
PoP Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree # of Conn Comp InO
74 54.51% 75999 54506 1.4 21493 43.44%
7 9.40% 16165 9400 1.2 6765 16.30%
11 7.78% 13648 7779 1.1 5869 13.99%
128 7.63% 13765 7631 1.1 6134 10.88%
267 7.52% 11079 7521 1.4 3558 35.77%
4 7.31% 12505 7305 1.2 5200 16.83%
435 7.13% 10568 7127 1.3 3441 34.88%
282 7.08% 10587 7078 1.3 3509 33.71%
291 6.37% 9392 6373 1.4 3019 35.71%
295 5.77% 8829 5774 1.3 3055 30.80%
Figure 4.6: Top 10 PoPs (pins) and router rendezvous (arrows)
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In the modied Chord's case as shown in Table 4.6, top PoPs are almost the same
as those of Kad and only their ranks change, taking up 80.29% of overlay connections
aggregately. 74 is still the top 1 PoP observing 54.07% of total connections containing
77488 nodes, but all other PoPs observe fewer than 20000 nodes. As for sizes of weakly
connected components, shown in Figure 4.4 in log scale, PoP 74's largest component
is of size 23153 and others are quite small. Other PoPs' component sizes are fewer
than 300. Given all these statistics, if the average degree threshold can be relaxed a
bit, PoP 74 can be a good place for detection.
In simple ring's case (Table 4.7), the PoP numbers are exactly the same as those
of modied Chord. Figure 4.6 shows the geographical locations of the top 10 PoPs
represented by pin icons. Note that they hardly change across the three structures
and their locations are distributed throughout the US. 89.25% of overlay connections
reach top 10 PoPs with 54.51% traversing PoP 74. Despite the fact that half of
overlay connections can be observed at PoP 74, similar to the AS-Level, the number
of edges is smaller than the number of nodes. The largest component of PoP 74 is
very small containing 22 nodes (Figure 4.5). It is the same case for all other top
PoPs. Though InO values are moderate, low average degrees and a good many small
connected components can prevent the P2P structure from being captured at any
PoP.
4.4.3 Router-Rendezvous-Level Analysis
At the router-rendezvous level, we present results the same way as before. Router
rendezvous are denoted by ID numbers and ordered by the number of unique overlay
connections observed. For the Kad structure, as shown in Table 4.8, the top 10
router rendezvous are the same throughout the two days, altogether, see 89.75% of
total connections in day1 and 89.27% in day2. The top 1 router rendezvous number
2 is reached by 68.77% of all connections in day1 and 68.91% in day2. A majority
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of nodes (more than 98579) appear in the graph as one giant component at each top
router rendezvous. In addition, high average degrees and InO values make detection
feasible.
Table 4.8: Kad router-rendezvous-level
Kad Day1
Router Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree # of Conn Comp InO
2 68.77% 100000 40251799 805.0 1 100.00%
2164 14.91% 99959 8728267 174.6 1 98.96%
12 11.90% 99997 6967203 139.3 1 84.22%
98 11.75% 100000 6874621 137.5 1 100.00%
222 9.26% 100000 5419174 108.4 1 99.99%
8919 8.30% 100000 4855632 97.1 1 98.50%
745 7.82% 99997 4579803 91.6 1 99.85%
82 7.33% 99978 4288889 85.8 1 99.74%
47 6.99% 98858 4090556 82.8 1 92.32%
88 6.67% 99997 3904395 78.1 1 99.71%
Kad Day2
2 68.91% 100000 40945772 818.9 1 100.00%
2164 14.52% 99959 8626011 172.6 1 99.32%
12 11.57% 99989 6876147 137.5 1 83.77%
98 11.28% 100000 6702210 134.0 1 100.00%
222 9.05% 100000 5379049 107.6 1 99.98%
8919 7.41% 100000 4404198 88.1 1 98.60%
745 7.67% 100000 4559186 91.2 1 99.86%
82 7.24% 99973 4304038 86.1 1 99.68%
88 6.53% 99996 3881327 77.6 1 99.61%
47 6.18% 98579 3671730 74.5 1 90.15%
Let us take a look at the modied Chord at the router-rendezvous level (Table
4.9). There is one new router rendezvous in the top 10 list that does not appear
in that of Kad's and the ranks of the two lists are quite similar. Top 10 router
rendezvous carry 89.96% of total connections and the top 1 router rendezvous is still
2 accounting for 68.76% of connections including 88913 nodes. As for the sizes of
weakly connected components, the trend does not dier much from that at the AS-
or PoP-level. The top 1 router rendezvous's largest connected component is of a big
size|35943 nodes (Figure 4.7 in log scale) and other components have small sizes
(fewer than 15). With a distinctive average degree and high InO value, this router
rendezvous is a reasonable venue for capturing the modied Chord.
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Table 4.9: Modied Chord router-rendezvous-level
Router Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree # of Conn Comp InO
2 68.76% 88913 120337 2.7 13816 59.33%
2164 15.00% 29299 26245 1.8 8964 25.60%
12 11.57% 23682 20247 1.7 7629 20.07%
98 11.33% 21641 19821 1.8 5586 31.07%
222 8.73% 17779 15280 1.7 4771 27.68%
745 7.59% 16673 13275 1.6 5286 17.14%
82 7.29% 16133 12758 1.6 4926 19.98%
8919 6.94% 13649 12151 1.8 3067 32.38%
88 6.26% 12913 10962 1.7 3364 25.96%
57 6.16% 13606 10784 1.6 4029 19.42%
Table 4.10: Simple ring router-rendezvous-level
Router Percentage # of Nodes # of Edges Avg Degree # of Conn Comp InO
2 68.89% 88161 68885 1.6 19276 56.27%
2164 15.12% 25513 15122 1.2 10391 18.54%
12 11.35% 20126 11351 1.1 8775 12.80%
98 11.28% 17720 11275 1.3 6445 27.26%
222 8.93% 14243 8933 1.3 5310 25.44%
745 7.42% 13218 7419 1.1 5799 12.26%
82 7.36% 12653 7356 1.2 5297 16.27%
8919 7.13% 10568 7127 1.3 3441 34.88%
88 6.10% 9762 6102 1.3 3660 25.02%
47 6.06% 9669 6061 1.3 3608 25.37%
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Finally, for the simple ring structure (Table 4.10), the top router rendezvous list
is the same as that of Kad. Figure 4.6 illustrates all top router rendezvous for the
three structures, each represented by an arrow with a star. Note that some of them
are co-located with the top PoPs: in fact, PoPs are a subset of router rendezvous.
Top 10 router rendezvous observe 80.54% of all connections and router 2 sees 68.89%
of them. With more nodes than edges at each top router rendezvous, it is dicult
to get a good view of the P2P overlay. Similar to AS- and PoP-level, the top 1
router rendezvous's largest component contains 33 nodes. The average degrees are
unsurprisingly low, insucient for detection.
4.4.4 Insights from Analysis
From the above analysis, we have several key observations worth noting. First,
the visibility of Kad's overlay and structure at the top places of all three levels is
good enough for detection; the modied Chord's P2P characteristics can be captured
by a few top locations but not all; and the information of the hypothetical simple
ring's topology at all levels is quite fragmented and hardly useful for detection. From
the attacker's viewpoint, in terms of eciency, Kad has the most ecient routing:
contacting O(logN) nodes during a search (where N is the size of the network); the
modied Chord can achieveO(log2N) hops; and the simple ring is the worst, requiring
O(N) steps. From resilience's perspective, the Kad network is shown to be robust to
a few types of mitigation strategies such as cutting o random nodes and removing
peers learnt from bots' peer lists [36]; the simple ring structure is evidently fragile|
removing a couple of nodes can disconnect the overlay; and the modied Chord
structure hits the middle ground: not as resilient as Kad but better than the simple
ring. We believe that, while constructing a P2P botnet, the attacker needs to strike a
balance between resilience or eciency and the ability to evade detection. Although
the simple ring can hide its trac well at various network components, to build
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upon this structure the botnet has to compromise resilience and C&C eciency. The
modied Chord makes a tradeo though its structural properties cannot be concealed
at some locations. Kad was successfully utilized by the Storm botnet, but given our
detection strategy, to use it for a future botnet, the attacker has to come up with
techniques to mask its P2P patterns.
Second, from detection's perspective, AS-level provides better overlay views than
PoP- and router-rendezvous-level do, but is less practical than the other two for actual
detection deployment. Since AS is only a logical concept, capturing all connections
within one single AS requires collaboration and synchronization among multiple phys-
ical devices at dierent geographical locations, which renders it highly impractical.
From our analysis, we can see that at the PoP-level, detecting Kad and the modied
Chord is very likely though the latter is only visible to the top 1 PoP. Compared to
ASes and router rendezvous, PoPs observe less trac due to the invisibility of trac
within ASes (intra-domain trac). Moreover, the number of PoPs is small so that
the points available for monitoring are limited. Among the three, router rendezvous
make a tradeo. Their detection capabilities are comparable to PoPs' and they can
observe intra-domain trac with more monitoring points available, making detection
more feasible.
4.5 Discussions
Thus far, we have measured the eectiveness of identifying P2P overlay trac
at various network components. For actual implementation of the detection at the
Internet infrastructure, several challenges remain to be addressed.
First, since P2P networks implementing the same protocol may not be distinguish-
able at the structure-level via graph analysis, our techniques will also identify regular
P2P le-sharing topologies. To avoid misclassifying such regular P2P networks as
botnets, we can perform preprocessing including ow ltering and clustering [52]
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based on known patterns of regular P2P networks such as port numbers. Also, bots
identied locally in edge networks are helpful as their presence in a communication
graph makes other nodes suspicious as well, so our approach may need assistance from
detection mechanisms at the edge to further conrm that a graph is indeed formed by
a botnet. However, if the botnet is immersed into an existing regular P2P network,
detecting it solely by graph analysis at the infrastructure level would be challenging
and other information is thus needed for eective detection.
Second, in the presence of a huge trac volume, some connections could not be
captured due to sampling. For densely-connected topologies such as Kad, it may not
be a problem. But for the modied Chord and simple ring's cases, it will complicate
the detection. We plan to dig deeper into this issue in the future.
Third, after identifying nodes of a botnet, to further mitigate or contain bots, we
need to come up with ecient and eective techniques that can accommodate a large
volume of trac at the infrastructure level with minimal impact on the legitimate
trac. In the edge or local networks, ne-grained information of a particular node is
available to detection mechanisms, and all incoming and outgoing trac of the node
can be controlled. Thus, after detection, taking the suspected node oine is not a
dicult task. However, at the infrastructure level, a single network component may
not have the ability and the condence to remove a node completely so that advanced
response mechanisms other than simply ltering or blacklisting are needed.
Finally, our models regarding the Internet infrastructure are abstracted from real-
world datasets, so the accuracy depends on how well the datasets characterize the
behavior and the state of the Internet, which could be error-prone. Moreover, some
datasets may be outdated and may not reect the current state of the Internet due to
its fast-evolving nature. Therefore, these factors have to be taken into account when
the infrastructure-level detection is put in practice.
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4.6 Conclusion
As P2P structures become a popular choice for recent botnets, especially large-
scale ones, detection mechanisms have to keep up with this change and identify bots
in an ecient and eective manner. In this paper, we propose detection of P2P bot-
nets at a high-level|the infrastructure-level by analyzing their structural properties
from a graph perspective. We construct three dierent P2P overlay topologies: Kad,
the modied Chord and the simple ring. These overlays are mapped to the AS-level
underlays and their respective AS-, PoP- and router-rendezvous-paths are inferred.
Finally, we inspect these network components individually to measure their capability
in identifying the P2P botnets. We nd that detection at any of the three network
components has its advantages and drawbacks. Overall, router-rendezvous-level de-
tection is able to strike a balance between detection capability and feasibility. Also,
a botnet needs to make a tradeo between resilience and stealthiness.
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CHAPTER V
The Next-Generation Botnet
5.1 Introduction
Botnets have become a most serious security threat to the Internet and the per-
sonal computer (PC) world. Although they have not yet caused major outbreaks in
the wild, attacks on cellular networks and devices have recently grown in number
and sophistication. With the rapidly-growing popularity of smartphones, such as the
iPhone and Android-based phones, there has been a drastic increase in downloading
and sharing of third-party applications and user-generated content, making smart-
phones vulnerable to various types of malware. Smartphone-based banking services
have also become popular without protection features comparable to those on PCs,
enticing cyber crimes. There are already a number of reports on malicious appli-
cations in the Android Market [7]. Although the Android platform requires that
applications should be certied before their installation, its control policy is rather
loose|allowing developers to sign their own applications|so that attackers can easily
get their malware into the Android Market. The iPhone's application store controls
its content more tightly, but it fails to contain jailbroken iPhones which can install
any application and even run processes in the background. As smartphones are in-
creasingly used to handle more private information with more computing power and
capabilities but without adequate security and privacy protection, attacks targeting
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mobile devices are becoming more sophisticated. Since the appearance of the rst,
proof-of-concept mobile worm, Cabir, in 2004, we have witnessed a signicant evolu-
tion of mobile malware. The early malware performed tasks, such as infecting les,
replacing system applications and sending out SMS or MMS messages. One malicious
program is usually capable of only one or two functions. Although the number of mo-
bile malware families and their variants has been growing steadily in recent years,
their functionalities have remained simple until recently.
SymbOS.Exy.A trojan [85] was discovered in February 2009 and its variant Sym-
bOS.Exy.C resurfaced in July 2009. This mobile worm, which is said to have \botnet-
esque" behavior patterns, diers from other mobile malware because after infection,
it connects back to a malicious HTTP server and reports information of the device
and its user. The Ikee.B worm [51] that appeared late November 2009 targets jail-
broken iPhones, and has behavior similar to SymbOS.Exy. Ikee.B also connects to
a control server via HTTP, downloads additional components and sends back the
user's information. With this remote connection, it is possible for attackers to peri-
odically issue commands to and coordinate the infected devices to launch large-scale
attacks. In March 2011, over 50 applications found to contain a type of malware
called \DroidDream" were removed from the Android Market [7]. This malware was
able to root the infected device and steal sensitive information. It was speculated
that the end goal of DroidDream was to create a botnet [11]. Observing the trend
of recent mobile malware, we expect that mobile botnets will likely become a serious
threat to smartphone soon.
Similar to PC-based botnets, mobile botnets also require three key components:
vectors to spread the bot code to smartphones; a channel to issue commands; and a
topology to organize the botnet. Compared to their PC counterparts, mobile devices
have the following unique features that botnets can take advantage of: (1) they
communicate via multiple vectors including SMS/MMS messages, Bluetooth, aside
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from the conventional IP network. (2) they move around frequently, and it is generally
dicult to nd vantage points that can observe devices' all activities. (3) they have
limited security protection features both in the host and in the cellular network.
These features together present a good opportunity for next-generation botnets to
exploit. So in this chapter, we focus on the design of a proof-of-concept botnet that
makes the most of mobile services and is resilient to disruption. Within this mobile
botnet, all C&C communications are done via SMS messages since SMS can reach
almost every mobile phone anywhere anytime with little scrutiny and restriction from
mobile carriers. To hide the identity of the botmaster, there are no central servers
dedicated to command dissemination that is easy to be identied and then removed.
Instead, we adopt a P2P topology that allows botmasters and bots to publish and
search for commands in a P2P fashion, making their detection and disruption much
harder. We will also briey discuss a few defensive strategies and how the detection
solutions proposed in previous chapters can be applied.
5.1.1 Contributions
Our contributions are three-fold. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the
rst to design mobile botnets with focuses on both C&C protocol and topology by
integrating the SMS service and the P2P topology. The main intent of this work
is to shed light on potential botnet threats targeting smartphones. Since current
techniques against PC botnets may not be applied directly to mobile botnets, our
proposed mobile botnet design makes it possible for security researchers to inves-
tigate and develop countermeasures before mobile botnets become a major threat.
Second, we present a method to carefully disguise C&C content in spam-looking SMS
messages. Using this approach, the botnet can stealthily transmit C&C messages
without being noticed by phone users. Third, we test and compare two P2P architec-
tures that can be used to construct the topology of our mobile botnet on an overlay
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simulation framework, and nally propose the architecture that best suits mobile
botnets.
5.1.2 Organization
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes related
work in this domain. Section 5.3 details the proof-of-concept design of our mobile
botnet. Section 5.4 presents our simulation and evaluation results. Section 5.5 dis-
cusses potential countermeasures against the mobile botnets. The chapter concludes
with Section 5.6.
5.2 Related Work
The research areas most relevant to our work are P2P-based botnets and botnet
C&C evaluation. Wang et al. [89] proposed the design of an advanced hybrid P2P
botnet that implemented both push and pull C&C mechanisms and studied its re-
silience. In [90] they conducted a systematic study on P2P botnets including bot
candidate selection and network construction, and focused on index poisoning and
Sybil attacks. Overbot [81] is a botnet protocol based on Kademlia. The strength of
this protocol lies in its stealth in the communication between the bots and the bot-
master leveraging a public-key model. Davis et al. [36] compared the performance
of Overnet with that of Gnutella and other complex network models under three
disinfection strategies. Singh et al. [78] evaluated the viability of email communica-
tion for botnet C&C. Nappa et al. [66] proposed a botnet model exploiting Skype's
overlay network to make botnet trac undistinguishable with legitimate Skype traf-
c. All of these dealt with botnets in the PC world, while our work targets mobile
botnets, in which C&C channel and network structure requirements are dierent, in
view of unique services and resource constraints on smartphones. Dagon et al. [35]
proposed key metrics to measure botnets' utility for conducting malicious activities
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and considered the ability of dierent response techniques to disrupt botnets.
There are numerous eorts on mobile malware focusing on vulnerability analysis
and attack measurements. The former investigates ways of exploiting vulnerable
mobile services, such as Bluetooth and MMS [30, 72], while the latter characterizes
the feasibility and impact of large-scale attacks targeting mobile networks, mostly
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [38]. There are a few recent papers treating the idea
of mobile botnets. In [86], the focus is on the attack aspect|whether compromised
mobile phones can generate sucient trac to launch a DoS attack. Singh et al.
[77] investigated using Bluetooth as a C&C to construct mobile botnets without
any analysis on their network structure. Hua et al. [50] proposed a SMS-based
mobile botnet using a ooding algorithm to propagate commands with the help of
an internet server. The use of the server may lead to single-point-of-failure, meaning
that whenever the server is identied and removed, the botnet is prone to disruption.
Mulliner et al. [64] demonstrated the ways to command and control botnets via
SMS or IP-based P2P networks using a tree topology. Under such topology, when
a node fails, all of its subnodes will be isolated from the botnet, dicult to get
commands. Weidman [92] also considered utilizing SMS messages for botnet C&C and
presented a method to conceal malicious SMS messages from users on smartphones.
It is worth noting that, dierent from all these works, our SMS-based botnet is built
upon a decentralized P2P topology, without assistance from any central servers. The
integration of SMS and P2P makes our botnet stealthy and resilient to disruption.
5.3 Mobile Botnet Design
We now present the detailed design of a proof-of-concept mobile botnet. The
botnet design requires three main components: (1) vectors to spread the bot code to
smartphones; (2) a channel to issue commands; (3) a topology to organize the botnet.
We will briey overview approaches that can be used to propagate malicious code and
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then focus on C&C and topology construction.
5.3.1 Propagation
The main approaches used to propagate malicious code to smartphones are user-
involved propagation and vulnerability exploits.
In the rst approach, the most popular vector is social engineering. Like their PC
counterparts, current smartphones have frequent access to the Internet, becoming
targets of malicious attacks. Thus, spam emails and MMS messages with malicious
content attachments, or with embedded links pointing to websites hosting the mali-
cious code, can easily nd their way into a mobile phone's inbox. Without enough
caution or warning, a mobile phone user is likely to execute the attachments or click
those links to download malicious programs. The advantage of such schemes is that
they can reach a large number of phones. Nevertheless, as smartphones run on a
variety of operating systems, we expect multiple versions of bot code prepared to
guarantee its execution. Another user-involved propagation vector can be Bluetooth,
which utilizes mobility. Mobile phone users move around so that the compromised
phones can use Bluetooth to search for devices nearby and after pairing with them
successfully, try to send them malicious les.
Exploiting vulnerabilities to spread malicious code is common in the PC world.
However, since there are various mobile platforms and most of them are closed-source,
it is dicult to nd vulnerabilities in real deployments. To date, some vulnerabilities
have been discovered. For example, the HTC's Bluetooth vulnerability, which allows
an attacker to gain access to all les on a phone by connecting to it via Bluetooth,
was disclosed by a Spanish security researcher [9]. Mulliner et al. [63] discovered a
way of directly manipulating SMS messages on dierent mobile platforms, without
necessarily going through the mobile provider's network. In both cases, OS vendors
immediately released patches to the public after the vulnerabilities were publicized,
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leaving few opportunities for a real exploit in the wild. Once launched in their targets,
vulnerability exploits always have a higher success rate than that of user-involved ap-
proaches. As mobile platforms open up and mobile applications and services become
abundant, vulnerability exploits will play a major role in mobile malware propagation.
5.3.2 Command and Control
5.3.2.1 Why SMS
In our mobile botnet, SMS is utilized as the C&C channel, i.e., compromised mo-
bile bots communicate with botmasters and among themselves via SMS messages.
Botnets in the PC world mostly rely on IP-based C&C delivery. For example, tradi-
tional botnets use centralized IRC or HTTP protocol, whereas newly-emerged botnets
take advantage of P2P communication. Unlike their PC counterparts, smartphones
can hardly establish and maintain steady IP-based connections with one another. One
reason is that they move around frequently. Another reason is that private IPs are
normally used when smartphones access networks, especially EDGE and 3G networks,
meaning that accepting incoming connections directly from other smartphones is a
dicult task. Given this limitation, if a mobile botnet considers an IP-based channel
as C&C, it needs to resort to centralized approaches in which bots connect to central
servers to obtain commands. Such approaches, however, are vulnerable to disruption
because the servers are easy to be identied by defenders. Thus, to construct a mobile
botnet in a more resilient manner, a non-IP-based C&C is needed.
There are a few advantages for choosing SMS as a C&C channel. First, SMS is
ubiquitous. It is reported that SMS text messaging is the most widely used data
application on the planet, with 2.4 billion active users, or 74% of all mobile phone
subscribers sending and receiving text messages on their phones [79]. When a mo-
bile phone is turned on, this application always remains active. Second, SMS can
accommodate oine bots easily. For example, if a phone is turned o or has poor
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signal reception in certain areas, its SMS communication messages will be stored in a
service center and delivered once the phone is turned back on or the signal becomes
available. Third, malicious content in the C&C communication can be hidden in SMS
messages. According to a survey in China [5], 88% of the phone users polled reported
they had been plagued by SMS spamming. As SMS spamming becomes prevalent,
bots can encode commands into spam-looking messages so that users will not suspect.
Last but not least, currently there are multiple ways to send and receive free SMS
messages directly on smartphones [23, 24] or through some web interfaces. We will
describe such methods in Section 5.3.2.4. Even when the free texting is unavailable, as
many phone users use SMS plans to avoid per-message charge and in some countries
incoming messages are free of charge, with the design goal of minimizing the number
of SMS messages we expect that using SMS as C&C will not incur considerable costs.
5.3.2.2 SMS Overview
Before discussing how to use SMS for C&C, we briey describe the implementation
of SMS. When a user sends a SMS message, the mobile phone sends it along with the
address of the Short Message Service Center (SMSC) over the air interface to a Base
Station Subsystem (BSS) of the service provider. The BSS then sends the text to the
Interworking Mobile Switching Center (MSC) of the SMSC. The Interworking MSC
returns an acknowledgment indicating success or failure, and passes the message to
the actual Service Center (SC) of the SMSC for its storage and/or delivery. When
it delivers the message, the SMSC queries a database called Home Location Register
(HLR) to determine the location of the mobile phone. If the phone is available, the
message is forwarded through a few steps to the MSC which nally delivers the text
message over the air interface through its BSS to the recipient's phone.
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5.3.2.3 Protocol Design
Our goal is to let a phone that has installed our bot code perform activities
according to the commands in SMS messages without being noticed by the user, if
possible. In our design, every compromised phone has an 8-byte passcode. Only by
including this passcode into the SMS messages, can other phones successfully deliver
C&C information to this particular phone. Upon receipt of a SMS message, this
phone searches for its passcode and pre-dened commands embedded in the message
to tell if it is a C&C message. If found, the commands are immediately executed
by the phone. Two issues need to be addressed here. First, how are passcodes
allocated among compromised phones? Second, how to make C&C SMS messages
appear harmless so that users may not notice the malicious content?
In our botnet, passcodes are allocated by botmasters to segment a botnet into sub-
botnets, each with a dierent function. For example, one sub-botnet is responsible
for sending out spam messages, while another is in charge of stealing personal data
and transferring them to a malicious server. Each sub-botnet will be identied by
its unique passcode that is hard-coded into the bot's binary. In other words, all bots
within the same sub-botnet share the same passcode so that they can communicate
with one another and also with the botmaster. Using a unique passcode for each
bot will be more secure than using one passcode for an entire sub-botnet because
in the latter case, the passcode will be discovered more easily. However, there is a
tradeo: using a unique passcode will add more overhead due to the pairwise passcode
exchange before each communication. The additional cost is undesirable since our
goal is to minimize the number of SMS messages to be sent.
Not only do we require a passcode included in each SMS communication message,
but also we encode commands to make it dicult for a user to gure them out. In fact,
on the Android platform, it is possible for an application to send out SMS messages
stealthily, to get immediate notication of every incoming SMS message by registering
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Your paypal account was hijacked (Err msg: 
NzkxMjAzNDIxODExMDUyM183Mz). 
Respond to http://www.bhocxx.paypal.com
using code Q3MDk2NDUyXzEyMzQ1Njc4
Free ringtones download at 
www.myringtone.com, using 
username VIP, password 
YTJiNGQxMWw to log on
FIND_NODE 
7912034218110523 _7347096452
_12345678
SEND_SYSINFO
a2b4d11l
Figure 5.1: Disguised SMS messages
itself as a background service and to read and execute commands or even delete the
message before the user sees it. We still want to hide the C&C messages because
other mobile platforms are more restricted than Android; they may not allow our
bots to both send and receive SMS messages without notifying the user. If malicious
messages show contents directly, they will be easily captured and manipulated by
defenders. To evade such detection, we want to make a command-embedded SMS
message look like a common message such as a spam message. There are benets
of using spam-like messages to transmit C&C. As pointed out in [8], cellular carriers
cannot simply block oending SMS messages because the senders have paid for the
messages and the carriers fear permanent deletion of legitimate messages when there
are no spam folders available. We will present a real-world experiment in Section
5.4.3. Even if in the future the carriers lter out spam messages and dump them into
spam folders, similar to the email ltering, spam messages can still reach the target
phones by going to the spam directory, which actually helps hide the C&C because
users tend to ignore spam.
Considering the fact that each SMS message only contains up to 160 characters,
commands in our botnet are concise. For example, \FIND NODE" instructs a bot to
return the phone numbers of certain nodes; \SEND SYSINFO" asks a bot to reply
with system information. To disguise messages, each command is mapped to one
spam template. Additional information such as the phone number and the afore-
mentioned passcode are variables in the templates, and they are Base64-encoded.
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Figure 5.1 shows two disguised SMS messages. The rst one is a \FIND NODE"
message (146 characters) with passcode 12345678 requiring the recipient to locate
a bot whose ID is 7912034218110523, and the result should be returned to the
bot whose phone number is (734)7096452. NzkxMjAzNDIxODExMDUyM183Mz
and Q3MDk2NDUyXzEyMzQ1Njc4|two random strings together|are the Base64-
encrypted 7912034218110523 7347096452 12345678. The entire encoded string is split
into two|disguising one as an error message and the other as a code|making it
resemble a spam message. The second example is a \SEND SYSINFO" message
(98 characters) with a passcode a2b4d11l. This template is dierent from that of
\FIND NODE" message. The passcode is also Base64-encoded and appears as a
password in the disguised message. To decode messages, each bot keeps a command-
template mapping list. Since only tens of commands are needed in our botnet, this
list is not long. To make detection harder, one command message can correspond
to dierent spam templates and the templates can be updated periodically. As just
shown, a command along with additional information can be easily embedded into
one SMS message which appears to be a spam, familiar to today's phone users, so
users are likely to ignore such messages even if they open and read them. If users
choose to delete these messages, it will not cause any problem to the botnet because
the commands have already been executed upon their receipt. Without monitoring
phone behavior or reverse engineering, defenders may have diculty in guring out
the mapping between spam templates and commands.
5.3.2.4 Sending SMS Through the Internet
Although sending SMS messages through the cellular networks is always possible,
the botmasters want to hide their identity and lower costs as much as possible. To
achieve this goal, botmasters can use the Internet to disseminate C&C messages to the
mobile botnet. There are several ways to do this. Many advertisement-based websites
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provide free SMS services. Botmasters can type in messages via these websites and
have them sent to mobile bots, feasible for low-volume messaging. Using such services
does not require the sender's mobile number, an email address is sucient if a reply
is expected. If the botnet is large, botmasters need to create an account with mobile
operators or SMS service providers to make high-volume messaging possible at the
lowest price. Usually, this can be done by sending and/or receiving SMS messages
via email through a SMS gateway connecting directly to a Mobile Operator's SMSC
(Short Message Service Center). Currently, smartphone applications such as [24, ?]
oer free domestic and international text messaging when the phone is connected to a
WiFi and support both one-on-one and group texting. The user only needs to provide
a screen name to send and receive messages without revealing its identity. Both the
botmasters and bots can take advantage of such a service whenever possible to avoid
messaging costs.
To sum up, using SMS messages as the C&C is a viable solution for a mobile
botnet. Not only is SMS ubiquitous to every mobile phone, but botmasters and bots
are also able to disguise SMS messages, send bulk messages from the Internet at
very low cost while hiding their identities. Thus, using SMS is both economical and
ecient for the botnet.
5.3.3 Mobile Botnet Topology
In the previous section we have described the way SMS messages form the C&C
communication in our mobile botnet. In what follows, we introduce P2P topologies
that may be utilized to organize the botmaster and bots for publishing and retrieving
commands, and describe how to leverage existing P2P architectures to meet the need
for mobile botnet construction.
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5.3.3.1 Possible Topologies
Similar to botnets in the PC world, a mobile botnet can be structured in a tradi-
tional centralized way or in a newly-emerged decentralized P2P fashion. In the rst
approach, botmasters hard-code into each bot's executable a set of phone numbers
that are under their direct control. When a mobile phone is converted to a bot, it
contacts those hard-coded phones to request commands or wait for commands to be
pushed to them. Such a centralized topology is easy to implement but not resilient
to disruption. Obviously, once defenders obtain these phone numbers, they can track
down the botmasters and then disable the botnet; making the botnet susceptible to
a single-point-of-failure. To make our botnet robust to defenses, we adopt a P2P
structure instead.
Currently, there are several structures for P2P networks; they can be divided
into three categories: centralized, decentralized but structured, and unstructured.
Centralized P2P networks have a constantly-updated directory hosted at central lo-
cations. Peers query the central directory to get the addresses of peers having the
desired content. This structure is similar to the traditional centralized botnet ar-
chitecture and hence vulnerable to the central-point-of failure. Decentralized but
structured P2P networks have no central directory and contents are not placed at
random nodes but at specic locations. The most common systems in this category
are Distributed-Hash-Table (DHT)-based P2P networks, ensuring that any peer can
eciently route a search to some peer with the desired content. One notable imple-
mentation is Kademlia [61], used by several current P2P applications, such as eMule
and BitTorrent. Decentralized and unstructured P2P networks have neither central
directories nor control over content placement. If a peer wants to nd certain content
in the network in old protocols such as Gnutella, it has to ood its query to the entire
network to nd peers sharing the data. To address the scalability issues, current
unstructured networks adopt dierent query strategies to avoid ooding. There have
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also been extensive studies on how to make Gnutella-like systems scalable. One such
design is Gia [32].
5.3.3.2 Design
Both structured and unstructured P2P architectures can be modied to suit our
need for the mobile botnet because their decentralized nature hides the botmaster's
identity. Since the mobile botnet design should consider not only robustness but also
feasibility and eciency on smartphones, we need to compare these two architectures
to see which is more suitable. Specically, we base our structured and unstructured
botnet topology on Kademlia and Gia, respectively, for comparison. Note that in our
botnet, bots obtain commands mainly in a pull style, i.e., the botmaster publishes
commands and bots are designed to actively search for these commands. The other
possible mechanism for command transfer is push, meaning that bots passively wait
for commands. We prefer pull to push because push will get malicious activities
exposed easily. That is, under push many SMS messages are sent out from one or a
few central nodes, whereas pull can be implemented in a more distributed fashion.
In what follows, we overview each protocol and describe our design.
Kademlia is DHT-based and has a structured overlay topology, in which nodes
are identied by node IDs generated randomly and data items are identied by keys
generated from a hash function. Node IDs and keys are of the same length (128-
bit). Data items are stored in nodes whose IDs are close to data items' keys. The
distance between two identiers, x and y, is calculated by bitwise exclusive or (XOR)
operation: d(x; y) = x  y. For each 0  i < 128, each node keeps a list for nodes
of distance between 2i and 2i+1 from itself. This list is called a k-bucket, and can
store up to k elements. There are four types of RPC messages in Kademlia: PING,
STORE, FIND NODE and FIND VALUE. PING checks whether a node is online.
STORE asks a node to store data. FIND NODE provides an ID as an argument
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and requests the recipient to return k nodes closest to the ID. FIND VALUE behaves
similarly to FIND NODE. The only exception is that when a node has the data item
associated with the key, it returns the data item. Since there is no central sever, each
node has a hard-coded peer list in order to bootstrap into the network.
Considering the dierences between smartphones and personal computers as well
as the SMS C&C channel we adopt, we modify Kademlia's design to be suitable
for our mobile botnet's structured overlay construction. First, we do not use PING
messages to query whether a node is alive and should be removed from its k-bucket.
One reason for this is that SMS messages transmitting C&C can always reach their
recipients even if these phones are not online (messages are stored in the SMSC for
later delivery). The other reason is that our design tries to minimize the number
of messages sent and received. Removing PING messages eectively reduces C&C
trac and thus, the possibility of being noticed by phone users and defenders. Second,
instead of being randomly generated, a node ID is constructed by hashing its phone
number, similar to the notion in Chord [82] that a node ID is the hash of its IP
address. Doing so can undermine the eectiveness of Sybil attacks in which defenders
add nodes to join the botnet to disrupt C&C transmission. Evidently, if node IDs are
allowed to be randomly chosen, defenders will take advantage of this by selecting IDs
close to command-related keys to ensure a high probability that these sybil nodes are
on the route of command search and publish queries. In addition, the absence of an
authentication mechanism in Kademlia, meaning that anyone can insert values under
specic keys, presents an opportunity for defenders to launch index poisoning attacks
by publishing fake values under command-related keys once they know these keys, in
order to disrupt C&C. We thus use a public key algorithm to secure the command
content. While publishing a command, the publisher (the botmaster) needs to attach
a digital signature to that command. The signature is the hash value of the command
signed by the botmaster's private key. Its corresponding public key is hard-coded in
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each bot's binary. In this way, bots that will store the command are able to verify
that the command is indeed from the botmaster not anyone else.
Gia improves Gnutella protocol and has an unstructured overlay topology. Since
Gnutella has a scaling problem due to the ooding search algorithm, Gia modies
Gnutella's design and improves its scalability signicantly. There are four key com-
ponents in Gia's design: (1) a topology adaptation protocol to put most nodes within
short reach of high-capacity (able to handle more queries) nodes by searching and
adding high-capacity and high-degree nodes as neighbors; (2) an active ow control
scheme to avoid overloaded nodes by assigning ow-control tokens to nodes based
on capacity; (3) one-hop replication to maintain pointers to the content oered by
immediate neighbors; (4) a search algorithm based on biased random walks directing
queries to nodes that are likely to answer the queries.
Our design of unstructured overlay topology is based on Gia as mentioned before.
Our design removes the one-hop replication scheme because it requires each node to
index the content of its neighbors and to exchange this information periodically. This
scheme may help reduce the number of hops for locating a command, but will incur
additional storage and computation overheads. Moreover, each SMS message has a
limited length so that the exchange of index information cannot be done with a single
message but requires multiple messages, increasing the number of messages generated.
In our mobile botnet, the drawbacks of using such a scheme will outweigh its benets,
and we thus opt out of this scheme. Three other components are important to our
botnet because their combination ensures queries to be directed to high-capacity
nodes that can provide useful responses without getting overloaded. This is desirable,
especially in a mobile phone network, since smartphones also have dierent capacities
under dierent situations. For example, in a poor-signal area or when the phone is on
a voice call (SMS messages use the same control channel as voice calls for delivery),
the phone's capability of handling SMS messages is lowered, so it can only answer
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fewer queries. Overloading mobile bots is also a concern. If one bot receives/sends
a large number of SMS messages during a short period of time, its battery can be
drained quickly, and draw the user's attention. Overloading can be prevented using
the ow-control scheme in Gia. Another design choice worth mentioning is that
similar to the modied Kademila, a digital signature is attached to every command
to be published.
5.4 Evaluation
5.4.1 Comparing Two P2P Structures
We now describe our simulation study of structured and unstructured P2P archi-
tectures for mobile botnets and compare their performances. In the simulation, all
nodes are assumed to have already been infected by the vectors described in Section
5.3.1. Our evaluation focus is not on how the malicious bot code propagates, but on
how the botnet performs under two dierent P2P structures.
We modied OverSim [69], an open-source overlay network simulation framework,
to simulate mobile botnets with the two P2P structures. While comparing P2P
structures' performances, logical connections (SMS activities) among mobile nodes
matter most, i.e., what we care is the overlay network not the underlying physical
network. For example, the fact that mobile bots move around is not important in
our simulation because the change of geographic location hardly aects bots' SMS
message sending/receiving.
The metrics we use to measure performance are: number of overlay hops needed
for a command lookup; total number of SMS messages sent (number of those sent =
number of those received) when a botmaster-issued command is acquired by every
node; percentage of total number of SMS messages sent by each node during this entire
command-lookup; and message delay (from the start of the query until a command
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is received). These metrics reect how well each architecture meets the requirement
of our mobile botnet, namely, minimizing the number of SMS messages sent and
received, load-balancing and locating commands in a timely manner.
The churn (participant turnover) model we adopted in the simulation is the life-
time churn. In this model, on creation of a node, its lifetime will be drawn randomly
from a Weibull distribution which is widely used to characterize a node's lifetime.
When the lifetime is reached, the node is removed from the network. A new node will
be created after a dead time drawn from the same probability distribution function.
We set the mean lifetime to 8*3600=28800s, assuming that each phone will stay con-
nected to the botnet for an average of 8 hours. Considering the unavailability of real
eld data on mobile phones' online behavior, we made this rough estimate. We will
later evaluate the eect of dierent mean lifetimes on the botnet performance.
Besides the aforementioned performance metrics, another important metric is scal-
ability for which we simulated two botnets with 200 and 2000 nodes, respectively. In
each botnet, a command from the botmaster is published, and every node is designed
to locate this command by issuing lookup queries. The simulation ends when all
nodes successfully retrieve the command. In the structured botnet case, we ran the
modied Kademlia protocol, with k-bucket size k = 8 and the number of nodes to ask
in parallel  = 3. In the unstructured botnet case, we ran the modied Gia protocol,
with minimum number of neighbors min nbrs = 3, maximum number of neighbors
max nbrs = 10 and maximum number of responses max responses = 1.
Now, we present and discuss the comparison results. For each metric, we rst look
at the 200-node botnet and then the 2000-node botnet. Figure 5.2 plots the CDFs of
the number of hops needed to retrieve a targeted command. In the 200-node botnet,
for the structured architecture, 97% of lookups can be completed within 3 hops. The
corresponding number for the unstructured botnet is 5 hops. In the 2000-node botnet,
despite the increased network size, 99% of lookups under the structured architecture
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Figure 5.2: CDFs of the number of hops needed for a command-lookup
Figure 5.3: CDFs of the total number of messages sent to perform all lookups
are fullled within 4 hops, but under the unstructured 8 hops are required. Figure 5.3
shows the CDFs of the total number of SMS messages sent from each node when the
command spreads to the entire botnet, which is the total communication overhead. In
the 200-node botnet, under the structured architecture, about 80% of nodes generate
fewer than 15 messages during the entire period, while under the unstructured archi-
tecture 69% of nodes can do so. The average number of messages sent is 11 for the
structured and 15 for the unstructured, respectively. In the 2000-node botnet, with
more nodes and more lookups, the message overhead unsurprisingly increases. 80%
of nodes send fewer than 20 messages (51% of nodes send fewer than 10 messages) for
the structured architecture with an average of 22 messages sent by each node. Only
40% of nodes send fewer than 20 messages for the unstructured architecture with an
average of 44 messages.
From the above observations, we can see that the structured botnet, in general,
requires fewer number of hops to locate a command and incurs a lower message
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overhead on each node than the unstructured one does in both 200- and 2000-node
cases. Compared to the unstructured botnet, the structured architecture also scales
better, considering its slight increases in the number of hops and messages when
the botnet becomes large. This is expected because in a structured network, data
items are placed at deterministic locations so that fewer hops and query messages are
required to locate the targeted data and the network can accommodate a large number
of nodes. As mentioned before, on smartphones such as Android-based phones, bots
are able to send and receive C&C SMS messages stealthily without notifying users.
Users may gure that out while seeing the monthly bills, but by then bots have already
performed malicious tasks. Even if users are able to see them on the phone, since the
C&C messages are disguised as spam, they cause little suspicion. Even so, one may
still wonder: would SMSC observe a surge of messages among infected phones and
raise alerts? SMS market statistics show that: \In 2009, U.S. cell phone subscribers
sent and received on average 390 text messages per month according to the Mobile
Business Statistics [21]." We believe that tens of messages overhead per phone may not
draw much attention from the SMSC considering a phone's normal messaging volume.
Also, since most attacks such as information stealing and spamming are not time-
critical, bots do not have to pull commands all at the same time. To further minimize
the number of messages sent/received, each bot can be restricted by a threshold. If
the number of messages reaches the threshold, the bot will stop sending/receiving
messages. The threshold can be customized depending on the usage pattern of SMS
on that particular phone. If a bot has frequent normal SMS messaging behavior, (e.g.,
nearly 3000 texts per US teen per month in Q1 2009 [12]), its threshold of allowing
bot communication could be high since this phone is very likely to use a SMS plan
and a few blended malicious messages are less noticeable.
Figure 5.4 shows the histograms of load distribution on each node, which is the
percentage of total messages each node accounts for during the entire simulation. In
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Figure 5.4: Histograms of the percentage of total messages sent from each node
the 200-node botnet, 76% of nodes in the structured botnet each accounts for 0.75%
{ 1.25% of total messages sent, whereas in the unstructured one, the percentage
values are spread out among dierent nodes ranging from 0.10% to 6%. The average
percentage for the structured one is 1.02% and for the unstructured is 1.01%. To gauge
the load-balancing more accurately, we calculated a metric dened as:
Pn
i=1 jpi  
pj (), where n is the total number of nodes, pi is the load percentage at node i,
and p is the average percentage across all nodes. The () values for the structured
and the unstructured are 13.40% and 55.89%, respectively. In the 2000-node case, all
nodes' percentages in the structured botnet range from 0.05% to 0.25% while those in
the unstructured botnet are distributed within 0.05% { 1.65%, although the average
percentages for both the structured and the unstructured are 0.07%. The metric
() values for the structured and the unstructured are 23.73% and 145.48%. The
unstructured case varies more in load distribution leading to poor load-balancing,
probably because Gia uses schemes to direct most queries to a few nodes|forming
hub nodes.
To estimate the actual delay of locating a command in our mobile botnet, we
measured one-hop latency by sending SMS messages between two smartphones. We
implemented a SMS send/receive utility on the Android platform and installed it on
two G1 phones: one connected to T-mobile and the other to AT&T. The software
continually sent out and received SMS messages between two phones and recorded
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the exact timestamps. The intervals between two consecutive SMS messages were
chosen from 1 second to tens of minutes and the message contents were also randomly
generated with various lengths to simulate the realistic SMS usage. During the entire
experiment, we sent out a total of 138 SMS messages and collected the corresponding
message delays, i.e., the dierence between the time sending a message from one
phone and the time of receiving that message from the other phone. Figure 5.5 depicts
min/max/average message delays based on dierent sending intervals (sending rates).
We can see that when SMS messages are sent frequently, the message delays vary a
lot and have high average values. Take 1 second as an example. Under this interval,
delays range from 15 to 205 seconds with an average of 60 seconds. Similar delay
patterns occur when the interval is 5 seconds. The general trend is that as intervals
become larger, both delay average and variance drop, and that when the interval is
greater than 60 seconds, the delays become stable.
Since mobile attacks such as condential information stealing (especially related to
credit card, account number, etc.) are not time-sensitive, bots can send messages at
relatively long intervals to shorten the delay and avoid detection. Using a greater than
1 minute sending interval's delay, we now estimate the total delay for a command-
lookup. Under structured Kademlia which uses iterative search, the estimated delay
is given by AverageTotalDelay = 2AverageHopsAverageOneHopDelay. When
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it comes to unstructured Gia which employs recursive search, the equation should be
the same. By plugging in the data we obtained, the estimated command-lookup delay
is 17 seconds for the structured and 36 seconds for the unstructured in the 2000-node
botnet. (To be realistic, we only consider the large-scale scenario.)
The delays seem to be large compared to that of IP-based connections. As briey
mentioned before, our current design does not opt for IP-based C&C or existing IP-
based P2P networks for the following reasons. First, some smartphones may not have
data plans, not always accessible to the Internet. Second, for smartphones with the
Internet access, they can initiate connections to retrieve commands from designated
servers but are likely to suer from a single-point-of-failure. To work in a decentralized
P2P fashion, mobile bots should be able to accept incoming connections without any
diculty, which presents a challenge due to private IPs used in most scenarios. A
possible solution is to obtain assistance from a third-party such as a mediator server
or a rendezvous server, adding complexity to the C&C. Since SMS is ubiquitous across
all mobile phones, using SMS as the C&C channel to construct a P2P structure is a
feasible and reliable solution for mobile botnets. As future work, we can incorporate
IP-based command-transfer into our botnet. For mobile bots without network access,
they transmit C&C exclusively via SMS messages. For bots with network access, they
can pull commands from an IP-based P2P network. Such a network consisting of PCs
can be either constructed by the botmaster or part of an existing P2P network. Doing
so may help reduce the message overhead and the delay.
In summary, our simulation results show that the structured architecture outper-
forms the unstructured one in terms of total number of messages sent, hops needed and
delays for a lookup as well as load-balancing, although both the original protocols|
Kademlia and Gia|have already been tailored to our mobile botnet's needs through
several modications. Thus, the structured architecture is indeed better suited for
our mobile botnet.
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5.4.2 Eect of Churn Rates
Now that we have chosen the structured architecture, we would like to see the eect
of dierent mean lifetimes or churn rates on the number of hops for a command lookup,
which directly aects the delay of locating a command. To see the trend, in a 2000-
node botnet, we varied the mean lifetimes|100s, 1000s and 28800s. The higher the
mean lifetime, the lower the churn rate. Presumably, a large mean lifetime indicates a
relatively stable network in which fewer steps are needed to locate a command. This
assumption is veried in our simulation. We can see that in Figure 5.6, dierences,
though minimal, exist among the three CDFs. With the mean equal to 100s, the
average number of hops is 1.8; with the mean equal to 1000s, the average reduces to
1.7; with the mean equal to 28800s, the average decreases further to 1.4. It turns out
that a higher churn rate does not degrade much of the lookup performance.
5.4.3 Can Disguised C&C Messages Go Through?
One concern with our spam-like C&C messages is what if they are ltered and
deleted by the service providers without reaching the recipients, which might be the
only eective way to mitigate SMS spam (spam-ltering at the end device is not
useful as the recipient needs to pay for the messages already). According to some
sources [8, 10], mobile carriers do not automatically block SMS spam because there is
no spam folder with SMS so that accidental deletion of legitimate messages from the
carrier's side cannot be recovered by the users. Also, senders are presumably charged
for these messages unlike emails. To conrm this, we ran experiments to see whether
carriers will let our spam-like C&C messages pass through. Table 5.1 shows the spam
templates for C&C, which are typical spam messages. The random strings highlighted
in grey are variables such as passcodes and node IDs. We tried two methods to send
them: web-based and smartphone-based. For the rst method, we sent all messages
twice to an AT&T phone via free texting service at Text4Free.net and txt2day.com
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Table 5.1: Spam templates with variable elds in grey
1 Your paypal account was hijacked
(Err msg: NzkxMjAzNDlxODExMDUyM183Mz).
Respond to http://www.bhocxx.paypal.com using code
Q3MDk2NDUyXzEyMzQ1Njc4
2 Free ringtone download at www.myringtone.com, using username VIP,
password YTJiNGQxMWw to log on
3 Dear Customer, your order ID dWFuaWRpb3Q is accepted.
Please visit: www.xajq.apple.com for more info
4 Your business is greatly appreciated and we would like to award you a free gift.
http://www.protending.com/ebay/anVzdDRmdW4
5 To conrm your online bank records, follow the link
https://login.personal.wamu.com/logon.asp?id=YWhhaGFoYWg
6 Hey, come on - Purchase G.e.n.e.r.i.c V I A G R A!
http://www.WQ9.wesiwhchned.com/default.asp?ID=MTA5MzIxMnc
7 Citi Users: This is an important step in stopping online fraud.
Please verify your account at https://www.citi.com.Y2Nzc3Vja3M/verify/
8 Hey alice, I forgot to tell you yesterday that the password to that
account(MDkyMzkxMDM0OTgxMjAzN) should be
183MzQyNjIwOTM5XzUxOTQwMTI5
9 Don't miss the chance to win an iPhone 4.
Go to www.apple.hak/index.asp?id=OTAxMjc1MjM4OTExMTIzOD,
password: QyXzQxNDMyMTg3MzlfNjQ4MTkyMDQ
10 Guess who is tracking your location info?
Log on to www.whoistrackingme.com/index.asp?num=YWxqc2hmdy0
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respectively. 100% of them reached the designated phone. For the second method, we
wrote an application and installed it on an AT&T Samsung Captivate phone running
Android OS 2.2. This application automatically sent the spam messages 5 times at
dierent times of a day to another AT&T phone. The application also kept track of
whether a message was sent successfully. Out of the 50 messages, 48 messages were
sent and delivered to the target phone and 2 messages failed to be sent due to some
generic failure at sender's phone that had nothing to do with the carrier. Although we
were not able to thoroughly test every possible spam message on dierent networks,
our experimental results were in line with the aforementioned reports and we believe
that as few spam-ghting mechanisms are in place, our disguised C&C messages can
safely go through the network.
5.4.4 How Do SMS C&C and P2P Structure Become One?
Having an impression of how SMS transmits C&C messages and how a structured
P2P topology ts our mobile botnet, one may want to know in detail the way we
integrate both into the mobile botnet. We now use a simplied example (Figure
5.7) to illustrate the command publish and search process. For illustration purpose,
node IDs and data items' keys are 4-bit long, and SMS messages transmitted are
not disguised as spam. In this gure, node 1111 wants to publish certain data|a
command|under the key 0111. Note that in Kademlia, data items are stored in
nodes whose IDs are close to data items' keys. To locate such nodes, node 1111
rst sends SMS messages to nodes in its hard-coded node list; these nodes help
to obtain nodes closer to the target from their node lists. The process continues
till no closer nodes could be found (this process is omitted in the gure). Finally,
node 1111 nds the closest node 0110 (0110  0111 = 0001), so a publish message
containing the command's key (0111), the encrypted command (XXXX) along with
a passcode (8888) is sent to node 0110. After verifying the pre-dened passcode
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Node ID 0000
Number 331!645!0278
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3
Figure 5.7: Publish and Search
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and command, node 0110 stores this information so that later any node requests the
command associated with key 0111 it is able to return this command. As for the
search process, it is similar to the publish process described. Node 0000 looks up a
command associated with key 0111 and it has to nd the node whose ID is closer
to this key. Node 0000 rst asks node 0010; node 0010 points it to node 0100; node
0100 provides the closest one, node 0110. Node 0000 contacts node 0110 to request
the command.
5.5 Discussion on Countermeasures
Although we have focused on the design of a stealthy and resilient mobile bot-
net, we would like to discuss potential defensive strategies against this botnet and
challenges in using these techniques.
Similar to the patching mechanism in the PC world, to prevent malicious code from
infecting mobile devices by vulnerability exploits, OS vendors and software providers
need to push patches to end devices in a timely manner. Certication (only approved
applications can be installed) is also an important security measure, but it is far
from being perfect as some malware has been able to get around [19] as a disguised
harmless application. To nip the mobile malware in the bud, additional protection
features are necessary. For example, Kirin [37] is designed for the Android-platform
whose certication process is not stringent; it provides application certication at
install time using a set of predened security rules that determine whether the security
conguration bundled with an application is safe. With the aid of Kirin, users may
be more cautious while installing applications.
Host-based approaches that detect malware at runtime could also serve as a solu-
tion. Signature-based detection is eective but cannot handle unknown or polymor-
phic malware. Therefore, we prefer use of behavior-based detection. The detection
scheme proposed in Chapter II that monitors and captures per application behav-
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ior can be modied to detect mobile bots. For example, since our bots send SMS
messages stealthily without the user's involvement or awareness, the detector could
rst characterize the normal process of sending SMS messages by a system-call state-
diagram and then keep monitoring the system calls that generate outgoing messages
to see if there is any deviation from the normal behavior. To detect incoming C&C
messages, the detector needs to know the encoding scheme probably through binary
analysis so that it can tell which messages are malicious and intercept and delete them
before any application's access. However, the botmaster can apply advanced pack-
ing and obfuscation techniques to make the binary analysis harder, and periodically
update the spam templates as well as the mapping between them and correspond-
ing commands. In addition, host-level detection is susceptible to compromise by the
malware, and consumes much resource.
Deploying detection schemes at SMSC is another possible solution. Compared
to the host-level detection, this centralized approach can acquire a global view of all
phones' SMS activities, although the information of each phone might be limited. As
mentioned before, simply ltering out spam will not eectively cut o the botnet's
C&C. The reason is that even if carriers dump spam-like SMS messages into a spam
folder like email service providers do, spam messages will still reach target phones,
stay at a less noticeable place|the spam folder and get commands executed. Black-
listing and SMS sending/receiving rate-limiting may be dicult because our design
attempts to minimize the total number of messages sent/received and to balance
the load on each bot. As always, matching signatures extracted from known bots'
messages can be bypassed by malicious messages with completely new formats or
contents. Recall that in Chapter III, the network analyzer searches for botnet-like ow
patterns across dierent hosts based on multiple ow features and identify suspicious
hosts accordingly. The same notion can be applied here as well. To dierentiate
between mobile bots and normal phones, the detector at the SMSC needs to extract
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distinctive features from SMS trac patterns. For example, normal phones may have
regularities in whom they send messages to and the sending frequency [94]. Utilizing
such features, the detector can therefore build normal proles and identify anomalies.
The detector may also adopt a high-level view for detection. The large-scale detection
techniques proposed in Chapter IV that exploits structural properties of P2P botnet
topologies are applicable to this scenario. Because our mobile botnet utilizes a P2P
architecture, the resultant network topology stemmed from SMS activities will be
dierent from that formed by benign phones, given the fact that P2P applications
are rare in today's mobile phone networks. The detector at the SMSC can construct
communication graphs of mobile devices that send and receive SMS messages through
the SMSC and analyze whether the observed graphs have P2P properties.
5.6 Conclusion
As smartphones are getting more powerful, they become potential targets of prot-
driven attacks, especially botnets. In this paper, we presented the design of a mobile
botnet that utilizes SMS to transmit C&C messages and a P2P structure to con-
struct its topology. Specically, we used simulation to compare two types of P2P
architectures|the structured and the unstructured|based on several metrics crit-
ical to the mobile botnet performance. We found that the modied Kademlia|a
structured architecture|is more suitable for our botnet in terms of message over-
head, delay, and load-balancing. We also investigated possible ways to counter the
mobile botnet threat. As future work, we plan to combine SMS-based C&C and
IP-based C&C utilizing existing DHT or P2P networks. Since our current work fo-
cuses on the aspects of feasibility and eciency in botnet design, we would also like
to measure robustness, i.e., how our botnet performs under dierent detection and
mitigation strategies.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusions and Future Work
Botnets are a lethal weapon for attackers to conduct various cyber crimes. They
are increasingly used for spamming, phishing, identity theft and large-scale attacks
targeting websites and critical infrastructures. Botnets take a huge toll on govern-
ments, businesses as well as individuals, costing them millions of dollars every year.
As botnets utilize sophisticated methods such as obfuscated binary code and decen-
tralized C&C structures to hide their presence, detecting botnets is a challenging but
critical task.
In this dissertation, we investigated the botnet problem, devised behavior-based
botnet detection solutions from a small scale to a large scale at three dierent levels|
the end host, the edge network and the Internet infrastructure, and nally envisioned
the direction next-generation botnets are heading to. At the host level, the bot infects
machines and tries to spread itself. To mitigate that, in Chapter II, we proposed a
containment framework to rate limit the outgoing malicious network trac as much
as possible while minimizing the impact on benign trac. We developed monitors
at the le system, registry and network stack to capture runtime behavior for each
process in the system. Depending on how malicious the process is, the framework
eectively imposes rate-limiting policies on its trac. This per-process containment is
especially useful for mission or service-critical systems, which cannot aord shutting
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down the entire system immediately following worm infection but need to maintain
operations of critical services and application until they are nished or taken over by
healthy systems.
Considering that a host-based approach alone may not be reliable enough because
host-resident malware could compromise the detection scheme, we shifted our focus
to the local network where bots reside in to see if network-level information would be
helpful. We observed that botnets have recently been structured in a decentralized
fashion using P2P protocols as opposed to conventional IRC and HTTP for C&C,
making detection much dicult. But no matter what C&C botnets use, their un-
derlying properties are the same: bots need to get commands from somewhere and
launching attacks thereafter. In addition, they demonstrate anomalous and malicious
behavior in the host systems. Based on that, in Chapter III, we utilized the invariant
botnets' behavior for detection. We designed a novel hybrid detection framework that
incorporates information collected at both host and network levels. This framework
is able to detect dierent types of botnets regardless of their C&C structures with
low false alarm rates. One concern about this hybrid detection is its scalability be-
cause it requires collection of ne-grained information at the host-level. Since current
botnets' sizes are in the order of hundreds of thousands and they are scattered over
dierent networks, to substantially disrupt a botnet, a large-scale detection mecha-
nism is necessary. In Chapter IV, we considered taking a high-level view by exploiting
the structural properties of botnets topologies from a graph perspective. Specically,
we measured dierent network components' capabilities for large-scale P2P botnet
detection at the Internet infrastructure level and found that router rendezvous are
good venues to deploy detection practices.
The aforementioned three chapters mainly focus on detecting the current botnet
threats. In the arms race between attackers and defenders, we were the latter try-
ing to catch up. It is equally or even more important to get ahead of attackers by
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thinking about new vectors to host botnets and new techniques to control and struc-
ture botnets so that countermeasures could be in place by the time the hypothetical
botnets become real. Recently, the proliferation of smartphones presents a new and
exciting platform to attackers. Envisioning that the next-generation botnets would
take advantage of the mobile platform sooner or later, in Chapter V, we presented
the design of a proof-of-concept mobile botnet utilizing SMS messages to transmit
C&C and P2P as the underlying structure. We compared two P2P topologies via
simulations and found that an unstructured topology is more suitable for the mobile
botnet. We also showed that the detection solutions proposed in previous chapters
can be modied and extended to defend against this mobile botnet threat.
To summarize, the dissertation has made three primary contributions. First, the
detection solutions proposed utilize intrinsic and fundamental behavior of botnets
without relying on signatures of binaries or packet payloads, so they are immune
to malware obfuscation and trac encryption. Second, the solutions are general
enough to identify dierent types of botnets, not a specic botnet instance. They
can also be extended to counter next-generation botnet threats. Third, the detection
solutions function at multiple levels|the host, the edge network and the Internet
infrastructure|to meet various detection needs. They each take a dierent per-
spective but are highly complementary to each other, forming an integrated botnet
detection framework.
There are a few future directions that can be pursued following this dissertation.
 Automatic Behavior Analysis A key issue in the behavior-based detection
is how to quickly and eectively derive distinctive behavior patterns from ma-
licious programs. In this dissertation, manual analysis was used to construct
behavior features, which is a common practice nowadays. When the size of the
sample pool to be studied is small, manual analysis with human in the loop
is tedious but doable. However, the increased use of modularization, polymor-
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phism and metamorphism by malware writers leads to a tremendous surge of
new threats, calling for automatic ways to accelerate the analyzing process and
save human eorts. This is a challenging task because such automatic systems
require ecient monitoring, formalized behavior modeling and extraction, and
most importantly, minimal false-positive occurrences.
 The Implications of Large-Scale Botnet Detection For actual deploy-
ments of large-scale detection mechanisms at the Internet infrastructure, several
issues need to be further addressed. First, preprocessing and ltering uninter-
ested network trac is essential. Multiple techniques may be employed such as
port/protocol ltering and ow clustering. Also, in the presence of huge trac
volume, sampling may be necessary and how to do it without losing the big
picture remains to be a challenge. Second, since our detection is at the graph
level, having no access to ne-grained information, it will also identify regular
applications sharing the same topologies as botnets. To avoid misclassication,
our approach needs assistance from detection mechanisms at the edge to further
conrm that a graph is indeed formed by a botnet. It is therefore necessary
to develop such mechanisms for collaboration and communication between the
edge and infrastructure networks.
 Mobile Malware Detection and Mitigation The design of the proof-of-
concept mobile botnet is just the rst step; the ultimate goal is to develop
detection and mitigation approaches tailored towards smartphones before the
threat becomes reality. The detection solutions proposed in this dissertation can
be applicable to mobile devices, but modications and extensions are required.
For example, smartphones have resource constraints. A host-based behavioral
detection designed for PCs seen in Chapter II might be too heavy-weight for
mobile devices. A light-weight solution is desirable. One possibility may be
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collecting behavior information from devices and getting diagnosis remotely
from remote servers or in cloud instead of relying solely on a local detection.
Large-scale detection techniques described in Chapter IV need to be customized
for use at the SMSC or other vantage points in 3G or 4G cellular networks.
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